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This paper focused on the relationship between attitudes and behavior. 
A brief discussion of the attitude concept was followed by a description 
of a dominant framework used in the study of attitude-behavior relations, 
the theory of reasoned action. How intentions are viewed to mediate 
attitude-behavior consistency received special consideration. Next, the 
relationship between personality variables and attitude-behavior
consistency was briefly reviewed followed by a relatively detailed
discussion of the role that a particular personality variable,
self-monitoring, plays in moderating the attitude-behavior ’relationship. 
Research was reviewed which suggested that (1) increasing the perceived 
relevance of individuals’ attitudes relative to some pending behavior and 
(2) conveying normative information relative to individuals’ attitudes
would each have an effect on the degree of attitude-behavior consistency 
manifested by these individuals. Further, research was reviewed which 
suggested that this effect would be moderated by the personality type of 
the subject as defined by the self-monitoring scale.
One hundred fifty two female and male subjects were assessed with the 
self-monitoring scale. Using the median split procedure, subjects were 
then assigned to one of the four experimental conditions defined by the 
presence or absence of (i) a relevance strategy and (25 normative 
information. Attitudes, intentions, normative beliefs, behavioral beliefs 
and motivations to comply with significant referents were assessed before 
and after the experimental manipulations. Voting and volunteering time to 
work on the given issue constituted the dependent variable. It was 
predicted that (1) regardless of the presence or absence of normative 
information, for those subjects exposed to the relevance strategy 
attitude-intention and intention-behavior correlations would be equally 
strong for both high and low self-monitors and (2) regardless of whether 
or not subjects were exposed to the relevance strategy intention-behavior 
correlations would be stronger for low than for high self-monitors in 
normative information conditions compared to conditions with no normative 
information. The results of the Pearson product-moment correlations 
provided no support for either of the two hypotheses. Several possible 
reasons for this lack of support and some possible strategies for 
clarifying the moderating roles of relevance strategies and normative 
information on the attitude-behavior relationship were discussed.
i i
Table of Contents
Chapter Is Introduction ........................  . . . . . 1
Chapter 2 s The Theory o-f Reasoned Action..........   13
Chapter 3s Personality and Attitude—Behavior Consistency 33
Chapter 4: Problem for Research. . . . . .  .............  5B
Chapter 5s Methods  ................................ . . . 8 2
Chapter 6s Results.............  . 91
Chapter 7s Discussion.  ...........  . . . . . . . . . . 9 5
References  .............    108
Appendix A . . . . .   ..........   115
Appendix B\ . . . . .  . ................................... 124
Table Is Correlations, z—Statistics, Probability
Levels, and Cell Sizes for High and Low Self—Monitors
in Relevance versus No Relevance Strategy Conditions. . 125
Table 2: Correlations, z-Statisties, Probability 
Levels, and Cell Sizes for High and Low Self-Monitors 
in Normative versus No Normative Information 
Conditions.............      126
Chapter Is Introduction
The nature of the relationship between attitudes and 
behaviors has been the subject of investigation for over a 
half a century (Schroeder, Johnson, & Jensen, 1985). In 
recent years, knowledge of this relationship has expanded 
considerably; our conceptual and empirical models have 
allowed increasingly more accurate predictions and 
meaningful explanations of behaviors based on knowledge of
attitudes (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). With these increasingly 
sophisticated ideas and techniques, however, has come an
increasingly differentiated array of perspectives on the
nature of attitudes and their role in moderating behaviors
(Chaiken & Stangor, 1987). This report will begin with a
discussion of the concept of attitude and will be followed 
by a brief overview of the relationship this concept has to 
the prediction and explanation of behavior. Next, a 
dominant theory of the relationship between attitudes and 
behaviors —  the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen &
Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) —  will be
described in some detail. Then, a brief introduction to
the relationship between attitudes and personality 
variables will be given, followed by a somewhat thorough 
discussion of the role a particular personality variable, 
self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974), plays in moderating the
1
attitude-behavior relationship. Following this general 
review, a research project will be presented. This 
presentation will include (1) a brief introduction
(recapitulating the major points from the previous review), 
(2) a section explaining the rationale for the proposed 
study along with a formal statement of the predictions, (3) 
a description of the methods and design used in conducting 
the study, (4) a description of the results of the data 
analysis, and (5) a discussion of these results.
The Attitude Concept
Aside from the generally accepted notion that, "the 
term ’attitude' was introduced in social psychology as an 
explanatory device in an attempt to understand human
behavior (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975, p. 336), the attitude
concept has not enjoyed a great deal of acceptance as a
theoretically valid construct (Neale & Liebert, 1980, pp. 
254-265). An excellent illustration of this confusion is 
provided by the following observations: (1) In a two year
period, from 1968 to 1970, over 500 different operations 
were used to assess "attitudes", and (2) of a sample of 
studies that used more than one measure of "attitude", 70X 
found different results depending on which measure one 
considered (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1972). A. recent review of the 
literature (Chaiken & Stangor, 1987) reflected the
3
perpetuation of this confusion by pointing out a multitude 
of differing conceptualizations of the attitude concept. 
Clearly, there continues to be a lack of consensus about
what is meant by the term attitude and how attitudes should
be measured. Consequently, this leaves a great deal of 
responsibility for researchers to clarify matters of
definition and assessment at the outset of their reports.
There have been three basic approaches to 
conceptualizing attitudes (Chaiken & Stangor, 1987). The
first, the tripartite model, views attitudes as being
composed of an affective, behavioral, and cognitive 
component. A second view, the two-component model,
considers only the affective and cognitive components while 
a third view, the unitary position, holds that attitudes 
are best conceptualized only in terms of the affective 
component. The cognitive component is defined by the 
beliefs about the attitude object and the relations this 
object has with other objects and attributes (Bagozzi 8e
Burnkrant, 1979). The affective component refers to the 
degree of emotional attraction to an attitude object
(Bagozzi & Burnkrant, 1979), or the evaluative dimension of 
an individual's concept of the given object and associated 
attributes (Fishbein & Raven, 1962). After reviewing a 
variety of these models —  with the purpose of deciding
4
which one best fits the data —  Chaiken and Stangor 
concluded that "a definitive judgment on the three— (or 
two—) versus one—dimensional issue seems premature given 
that the results of structural analyses sometimes vary with
1
the sophistication of researchers' LISREL programs (and 
their abilities to generate plausible models)" (p. 578). 
Consequently, the selection of a definition and method of 
assessment became a relatively arbitrary process.
According to Fishbein and Raven (1962), the term 
attitude "can be seen as the evaluative dimension of a 
concept" (p. 35) and can be operationalized in terms of the 
extent to which a subject refers to an object of evaluation 
as "good" or "bad". Even though this position would, 
according to Chaiken and Stangor (1987), be classified as 
unitary (affective), it is interesting to note that the 
concept of goodness/badness by itself does not constitute 
an attitude. Attitudes are held with respect to 
psychological, social and/or physical referents (Kerlinger, 
1973). Fishbein and Raven point out that in order for 
something to become the object of evaluation, it first must 
exist (to some degree) in the mind of the evaluator. They
1. LISREL refers to a set of statistical procedures 
designed to assess the causal relations among variables.
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use the term belief to describe both the probability that 
some concept (e.g., object, attribute) exists -for someone 
as well as the probability that two (or more) concepts are 
related to one another. To the extent that 
goodness/badness is viewed as a concept, the probability 
that this concept is associated with any given object can 
be described in terms of belief. At the same time, 
whenever we associate the concept of goodness/badness with 
some object we say that we hold an attitude toward that 
object. Hence, it is evident that any concept we refer to 
as an attitude has a probability dimension and an 
evaluative dimension. Extending this logic, for the 
purposes of this project, attitudes are viewed as 
evaluative beliefs. This view is consistent with Fishbein 
and Raven's work and was expressed nicely when they wrote: 
"an individual's attitude toward any object is a function 
of his Csic3 beliefs about the object (i.e. the probability 
that the object is associated with other objects, concepts, 
values, or goals) and the evaluative aspect of those 
beliefs (i.e. the attitude toward the 'related objects')" 
(p. 233).
Attitude-Behavior Consistency
Early research on the relationship between attitudes
6
and behaviors was characterized by the assumption that the 
former played an integral role in the production of the 
latter (Fazio & Zanna, 1981; Meyers, 1983). It has become 
customary to speak about the nature of this relationship in 
terms of the amount of consistency that is observed between 
measures of attitudes and measures of behaviors. After 
decades of research, the validity of the consistency 
assumption was seriously challenged; an extensive review of 
the literature indicated that the presumed consistency was 
not reliably observed (Wicker, 1969, 1971). Further, it 
became increasingly evident that the direction of influence 
between attitudes and behaviors could operate both ways 
(Bern, 1967; Festinger, 1957). As a result, interest in the 
relationships between attitudes and behaviors waned; ”a 
shift in the field found attitude research beginning to 
take second place to more cognitive—oriented approaches to 
social processes" (Schroeder, et al., 1985, p. 43). This 
period of disillusionment, however, was short-lived. 
Critical analysis of the attitude—behavior relationship 
revealed both conceptual and methodological inadequacies in 
past research that rendered any final conclusions about the 
nature of this relationship premature (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1972).
Conceptual inadequacies were reflected primarily by a
7
lack o-f agreement among researchers about how attitudes 
were to be defined, while methodological inadequacies were 
re-flected primarily by a lack of agreement about how 
attitudes and behaviors were to be measured. Although 
progress was slow with regard to resolving the conceptual 
difficulties associated with the definition of attitude, 
researchers interested in the relationships between 
attitudes and behaviors were gradually able clear up a 
great deal of the methodological confusion. For example, 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) were able to show that much of 
the confusion surrounding the attitude—behavior
relationship was the result of a lack of correspondence 
between the type of attitudes measured (typically quite 
general) and the types of behaviors measured (typically 
quite specific). These investigators demonstrated that 
consistently significant relations between attitudes and 
behaviors can be obtained to the extent that there is 
correspondence between measures of attitude and measures of 
behavior in terms of their action, target, context and tine 
elements. This principle will be discussed in greater 
detail in a later section.
As a consequence of such advances, in the last 20 
years research on the attitude-behavior relationship has 
once again begun to flourish. Moving past the question of
8
whether or not there is a relationship between attitudes 
and behaviors, recent investigations have spent a good deal 
o-f time focusing on tnhen a relationship can be expected to 
occur and, most recently, ho» such a relationship occurs 
(Zanna Se Fazio, 1982). Although the distinction between 
tuben questions and bat# questions may not always be clear, 
Zanna and Fazio maintain that this distinction is useful in 
conceptualizing the activities and progress of 
investigators working with a wide variety of psychological 
phenomena.
The question of when attitudes are systematically 
related to behaviors is directed at discovering the types 
of variables that moderate the attitude—behavior 
relationship and can be thought of in this way: "under what 
conditions do what kinds of attitudes held by what kinds of 
individuals predict what kinds of behavior?" (Fazio & 
Zanna, 1981, p. 165). The question of hota attitudes are 
related to behaviors is directed at discovering "how 
attitudes 'guide' or 'influence' behavior" (Zanna & Fazio, 
1982, p. 283); that is, given that a. moderating variable 
has been identified, the boundary conditions of its effects 
on the attitude-behavior relation must be specified. For 
example, given that perceived relevance has been shown to 
moderate the attitude-behavior relationship (Snyder &
9
Kendzierski, 1982), research needs to address the -factors 
that govern the presence or absence of this perception, the 
psychological processes that are involved with linking this 
perception to action, etc. An important research question 
from this latter point of view is: How does attitude
strength (e.g., operationalized in terms of the amount of 
previous experience with the attitude object, reaction 
time, etc.) affect the behavioral expression of this 
attitude (e.g., in terms of the degree of attitude—behavior 
consistency)?
What has resulted is an increasingly complex view of 
the relationships between attitudes and behaviors. In a 
review of the literature, Chaiken and Stangor (1987)
discuss two major orientations to the study of 
attitude-behavior relations. The first of these is
described as a combinatorial approach; it focuses on "the
ways that cognitions about a behavior are combined to 
create attitudes and/or intentions toward that behavior"
(p. 583). According to Chaiken and Stangor, the
combinatorial approach is best illustrated by Fishbein and 
Ajzen •'s (1975; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) theory of reasoned 
action which will be discussed in detail below.
• The second major approach to the study of 
attitude-behavior relations is described as a process
10
models it -focuses on the "underlying cognitive processes 
that influence the attitude-behavior relationship" (p. 
584). Specifically, Fazio et al.'s (Fazio, 1986; Fazio, 
Chen, McDonel, & Sherman, 1982; Fazio, Powell, & Herr,
1983; Fazio it Williams, 1986; Fazio & Zanna, 1977) work
focuses on (1) the strength of object-evaluation 
associations, (2) what these associations mean in terms of 
attitude accessibility —  i.e., "the likelihood or
readiness with which a construct will be retrieved from
memory" (Zanna it Fazio, 1982, p. 291) —  and (3) how
attitude accessibility affects the links between attitudes 
and behaviors.
While both of these orientations are fairly complex, 
the process model tends to be simpler to the extent that it 
typically includes only two basic measures of attitude for 
predicting behavior; a measure of attitude extremity (as 
indicated on a Likert-type scale), and a measure of
attitude strength (as indicated by the time it takes to
react to an attitudinal query). The reasoned action model, 
while typically employing a single measure of attitude 
(e.g., using a semantic differential type scaling 
procedure), also includes a number of other measures 
designed to aid in the prediction and explanation of 
behavior (e.g., beliefs, subjective norms, and
11
intentions). Further, as will be discussed shortly, the 
reasoned action model was largely designed to account -for 
all o-f the systematic variance thought to be involved with 
the production of behavior.
Finally, it should be noted that Fazio's process model 
—  which defines the attitude concept very similarly to the 
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) model —  has been shown to 
predict behavior at a level seemingly on par with the more 
complex reasoned action model (e.g., Fazio Sc Williams, 
1986). However, due to the different operational 
definitions employed by the different models, as well as 
the different domains of behavior tapped, it is currently 
impossible to assess (1) which of the two approaches 
actually predicts more of the variance in behavior and (2) 
which better explains the underlying basis for that 
behavior. Future studies that integrate and/or
simultaneously test these two models would seem to be vital 
for clarifying these very important theoretical issues.
In summary, theory and research on the 
attitude-behavior relationship was largely abandoned 
following reviews of the literature which revealed very 
little support for the assumption that behaviors could be 
predicted on the basis of attitudes. Eventually, 
methodological advances in attitude measurement allowed
12
researchers to see that there was, in fact, a great deal of 
consistency between attitudes and behaviors. As a result, 
theory and research on the attitude-behavior relationship 
moved beyond the "is" question to the questions of "when" 
and "how" this relationship could be expected to occur. 
Current research on these questions has resulted in 
increasingly complex views of the relationship between 
attitudes and behaviors. Two currently dominant
orientations to the study of attitude-behavior 
relationships, the combinatorial approach and the process 
model, embody these views. The following review and study 
will focus on theory and reasearch in the combinatorial 
vein.
Chapter 2s Tho Theory o-f Roaoonod Action
Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) theory of reasoned action
is predicated on the assumptions that <1> people are
generally rational and make systematic use of the
information available to them in the course of their
behavior, and that (2) most socially relevant behavior is
under volitional control, hence, ultimately determined by
an individual's conscious intentions. The concept of
behavioral intention, then, represents a key component of
the reasoned action model and it plays a central role in
the present study.
If the ultimate goal of the theory of reasoned action
was simply to predict behavior, the model could feasibly be
reduced to just the intention component. As Ajzen and
Fishbein (1980) point out:
The notion that intentions predict behavior 
does not provide much information about the
reasons for the behavior. It is not very
illuminating to discover that people usually do
what they intend to do. Since our goal is to 
understand human behavior, not merely predict it, 
the second step in our analysis requires that we 
identify the determinants of intentions” (pp- 
5-6) .
To outline the model to be discussed below: Intentions 
are viewed as being determined by the other two key
components of the reasoned action model, attitudes and 
subjective noras. Attitudes are considered to represent
13
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personal factors, while subjective norms are considered to 
reflect social influences. The attitude and subjective 
norm components are in turn determined by underlying 
beliefs. Addressing the question of why people behave the 
way they do requires, in the final analysis, consideration 
of an individual’s attitudes and subjective norms as well 
as the beliefs of which they are composed. Consequently, 
discussion of the various elements of the model will 
include the consideration of their underlying elements, 
beliefs.
The attitude component. It is important to note that 
references to attitudes in the theory of reasoned action 
are always references to attitudes towards behavior (as 
opposed to the more traditional conceptualization of 
attitudes towards objects, people or institutions). This 
very important principle stems from Ajzen 8c Fishbein’s 
(1977) argument that poor attitude-behavior correlations 
found abundantly in the literature were primarily a 
function of a lack of correspondence between predictors and 
criterion with respect to the dimensions of actionf target, 
context, and time. By formulating attitudinal measures in 
terms corresponding in specificity to the criterion 
behavior along each of these dimensions, the degree of 
attitude-behavior consistency is consistently higher than
IS
otherwise.
Beliefs underlying attitudes towards behaviors are 
referred to as behavioral beliefs and are conceptualized in 
terms of beliefs about the consequences of behavior. For 
any given act, a number of salient consequences are 
presumed to exist, some of which may be positive, some of 
which may be negative, and each of which is held with more 
or less confidence. Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) point out 
that people probably have a large number of beliefs with 
respect to engaging in any given behavior, yet they 
maintain that individuals are typically only capable of 
attending to a smal1 number of these at any given time. 
Hence, they believe that there is some set of salient 
beliefs that are responsible for an individual's attitudes 
at any given time.
Obtaining salient beliefs about some behavior can be 
accomplished by having subjects list the ones that come 
immediately to mind; the assumption being that those that 
come to mind the easiest are the salient ones. Fishbein 
and Ajzen (1975) admit that it is essentially impossible to 
determine precisely which beliefs are salient and which are 
not; that is, it is difficult to know when the list begins 
to reveal non—salient beliefs. They recommend using the 
first five to nine beliefs as a rule of thumb. An
16
additional concern when assessing salient beliefs is 
ensuring that these belie-fs correspond to the remaining 
elements of the model (attitudes and subjective norms) in 
terms o-f the dimensions of target, action, context and 
time.
As mentioned, correspondence among the elements of the 
model is vital at every stage. If accurate prediction and 
understanding of behavior is the ultimate goal, assessment 
of relevant variables must be systematically consistent 
with respect to the level of specificity across each of the 
previously identified dimensions. So, for example, if the 
go assess someone's attitudes towards obtaining a car, 
belief statements would need to be assessed on the basis of 
the type of car (target), whether the car would be bought, 
leased, rented, etc (action), whether it would be obtained 
from a used car lot, dealer, private owner, etc. 
(context), and whether it would be obtained within a day, 
week, month, etc. (time). By assessing every component of 
the model at the same level of specificity, we can be sure 
that what we are measuring has some relation to the 
behavior of interest. For example, if a car manufacturer 
wished to predict the likelihood of consumers purchasing 
their brand of car, assessment of general attitudes toward 
buying a car would probably not yield the best prediction
17
or comprehension of the consumers’ behavior. The bottom 
line is this: when attempting to predict and explain
behavior x, assess beliefs toward doing x, attitudes toward 
doing x, and intentions to do x, not some variation on x.
After a set of salient beliefs has been generated —  
expressed in terms of outcomes —  each belief is evaluated 
in terms of the extent to which the outcome is considered 
positive or negative (e.g., on a scale from +3 to —3). 
Next, each belief’s relative strength must be considered. 
Obtaining a measure of belief strength is tantamount to 
measuring the strength of the association between the 
behavior and projected consequence in question. This
approach is based on the operational definition of belief
provided by Fishbein and Raven (1962). These investigators 
defined a belief as "the probability dimension of a 
concept" (p. 35) and operationalized it in terms of the 
probability that the object of belief (e.g., ESP) is 
associated with some attribute (e.g, existence).
Measurement of the strength of a behavioral belief, then, 
entails obtaining a subjective probability estimate of the 
extent to which a given behavior is expected to be
associated with some consequence, or outcome (e.g., on a
scale from —3 to +3).
After obtaining outcome evaluations and subjective
18
probability estimates -for each o-f the specified behavioral 
beliefs, an individual’s attitude can be predicted by 
multiplying each outcome evaluation by its respective 
belief strength and then summing these products. The 
obtained value is a measure of the individual’s attitude; 
that is, the extent to which the behavior in question is 
viewed as positive or negative.
In practice, the prediction of a large group of 
subjects’ attitudes toward some behavior based on the 
evaluation of behavioral beliefs described above runs into 
some problems. Aside from the fact that it requires an 
inordinate amount of time to consider each subjects’ belief 
statements individually, meticulously selecting only those 
that correspond appropriately to the behavioral criterion, 
"the elicitation procedure usually produces sets of beliefs 
that differ from respondent to respondent in terms of 
content and number. This makes it difficult to compare the 
beliefs of different individuals and to submit their 
responses to quantitative analyses" (Aj2en & Fishbein, 
1980, p. 68). In light of these problems, the use of joodal 
salient beliefs is recommended.
Modal salient beliefs are obtained by having a 
representative sample of people from the population of 
interest list their salient beliefs with respect to some
19
behavior; "the belie-fs most frequently elicited by this 
sample constitute the modal set for the population in 
question" (p. 68). From the entire list generated, the
researcher typically must make a number of judgment calls 
in the process of selecting precisely which beliefs to use 
and in what grammatical form they will appear. Ajzen and 
Fishbein discuss a variety of possible approaches to 
selecting the number of modal salient beliefs to be used; 
i.e., using the first n most frequently expressed beliefs, 
using all beliefs expressed by at least n percent of the 
sample, or using as many beliefs necessary to account for t> 
percent of the number of beliefs generated. Combining 
conceptually similar belief statements into single 
grammatical expressions proceeds primarily on common sense, 
although a few general considerations were discussed; for 
example, where two belief statements of similar semantic 
properties exist as a part of the modal set, selecting them 
for use as independent belief statements or in some 
combined form as a single belief statement can be guided by 
knowledge of whether a particular subject included both in 
their list of salient beliefs. If this is the case, both 
could be used in the modal set, as would have been the case 
if only behavioral beliefs were being considered.
After the modal set has been decided on, a
20
questionnaire can be developed. As discussed above;, the 
belief statements should be expressed so that they 
correspond to the attitude toward the behavior in 
question. Use of a bipolar evaluative scale, with a 
mid—point of aero, allows the respondent to indicate if a 
particular modal belief statement is believed to be 
unrelated to the specified outcome. The bipolar scale also 
has the additional advantage of reflecting disagreement 
with belief statements reflecting negative outcomes (e.g., 
radiation causes cancer). For example, a negative 
evaluation of -3 (meaning the outcome, cancer, is viewed as 
extremely negative) multiplied by a likelihood estimate of 
—2 (meaning the outcome is not expected to be associated
with the object, radiation) would yield a net positive 
effect of +6 to the attitude in question (e.g., I would 
consider voting in favor of constructing a nuclear power 
plant in Missoula county within the next two years to 
be...>.
To understand why different people behaved
differently, the following procedure can be employed: After 
observing the actual behavior of a group of subjects,
comparisons can be made between those who performed the
behavior and those who did not. By looking at the relative 
effects of each belief statement on the attitude in
21
question, patterns tend to emerge that reveal the basis tor 
the ditterential behaviors. By comparing the values ot 
each variable across the two groups, it may be tound that 
subjects’ differential behavior can be attributed to 
differences on merely one of 10 belief statements, thereby 
revealing the reasons for the differential behavior. For 
example, it could be that in the group that voted for the 
nuclear power plant, likelihood estimates of whether 
radiation would actually be associated with cancer averaged 
—2.4, whereas the estimates of those who voted against the 
plant averaged +2.8. As Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) point out 
repeatedly, "in the final analysis, then, a person’s 
behavior is explained by reference to his (sic) beliefs" 
(p. 79).
The subjective norm component. Whereas behavioral 
beliefs are at the basis of the attitude component of Ajzen 
and Fishbein’s model, normative beliefs are at the basis of 
the subjective norn component. In general, subjective norm 
refers to the belief that most significant others think the 
person should (or should not) perform the behavior in 
question. It is this part of the theory of reasoned action 
that attempts to account for social influences; that is, 
perception of, and compliance with, the expectations of 
important others. The defining feature of a normative
22
belief, then, is that it is a belief held by an individual 
about another person’s belief about what this individual 
should do in a particular situation. Identifying a set of 
salient normative beliefs provides the basis for a measure 
of an overall subjective norm.
Normative beliefs can be elicited in the same way 
behavioral beliefs are elicited. In this case, however, a 
list of salient referents —  that is, significant others —  
is generated that has relevance for the behavior in 
question. As before, these belief statements need to 
correspond to the behavior in question to ensure that the 
identified referents will represent those of actual 
relevance. For example, eliciting salient referents that 
have relevance for whether to vote for or against the 
construction of a new building could depend on the type of 
building (e.g., nuclear power plant versus toy factory), 
where it would be constructed (e.g., Missoula county versus 
Mozambique), how it would be constructed and operated 
(e.g., by specially trained technicians from out-of-state 
versus hundreds of people from the Missoula area), and when 
it would be constructed (e.g., within the next year versus 
sometime between 30 and 40 years from now).
As was the case for dealing with behavioral beliefs, 
for practical purposes, the acquisition of Dodal normative
23
beliefs is usually preferred. After obtaining a set of
modal normative beliefs, subjects can respond on a
Likert-type scale to whether they believe that each of
these referents think they should (+3) or should not (-3) 
engage in the given behavior. This is accomplished by
their responses to a set of scales corresponding to each of 
the identified referents. Note that the normative belief 
scale is analogous to the outcome evaluation scale 
described for obtaining behavioral beliefs.
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) take the position that 
knowing a person” s beliefs about what salient referents 
think they ought to do is not sufficient to predict or
understand their overall subjective norm. Subjective norm 
can be understood only by assessing subjects' motivation to 
comply with each of the salient referents. Acknowledging 
that this component is the least understood (by them) in
their theory, Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) conclude that "on
both theoretical and empirical grounds it appears that 
motivation to comply is best conceived as the person's 
general tendency to accept the directives of a given 
reference group or individual" (p. 306). They go on to
suggest that individual differences on this variable may be 
related to personality characteristics such as need for 
approval or affiliation, self-esteem, or authoritarianism,
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but add that "previous work on personality variables of 
this kind in various areas of social psychology leads us to 
be rather pessimistic about the utility of this approach" 
<p. 306). The issue of what role personality might play in 
the theory of reasoned action will be returned to in 
greater detail at a later point.
Interestingly, Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) recommend 
using a unipolar scale to assess motivation; that is, a 
scale ranging from 0 (not at all motivated to comply) to 3 
(strongly motivated to comply). This recommendation is 
based on the assumption that people will not be motivated 
to do the opposite of what significant others think they 
should do. Given the possibility that this assumption is 
faulty, along with the relative ease with which a bipolar 
scale could be substituted, it seems more logical to use 
the latter. In any case, it should be noted that the 
motivation to comply scale is analogous to the belief 
strength scale described in reference to behavioral 
beliefs. As such, the derivation of the subjective norm 
component of the model follows the same procedure as the 
derivation of the attitude component; that is, for each 
referent the scale value for the normative belief is 
multiplied by the scale value of the corresponding 
motivation to comply. These products are then summed to
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arrive at a single value -for subjective norm.
The intention component. After obtaining measures for 
both the attitude and subjective norm components of the 
model, according to the theory of reasoned action, 
prediction of the intention component should be relatively 
straightfarward. There is, however, one other variable to 
consider; that is, the relative influence of the attitude 
versus the subjective norm component on the intention 
component. Application of the reasoned action model in a 
variety of domains and at a variety of levels ' of 
specificity with regard to the behavior in question has 
revealed that attitudes and subjective norms do not equally 
contribute to intention formation. In fact, according to 
Fishbein and Ajzen C1975), the relative influence of these 
two components is "expected to vary with the kind of 
behavior that is being predicted, with the conditions under 
which the behavior is to be performed, and with the person 
who is to perform the behavior (p. 303). So, for example, 
in cases where social pressure is at a minimum, attitudes 
might be expected to contribute most significantly to 
intention. In cases where social pressure is at a maximum, 
subjective norns might be expected to contribute most 
significantly. Even though common sense might dictate some 
expectations with regard to the relative influence of these
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-two components in a given situation;, there has yet to have 
been a technique developed for accurately assessing these 
influences prior to noting their actual relationship to 
intention. In the absence of accurate information about 
the true weights of these components, then, estimates of 
these weights are derived empirically by means of 
regression analysis. Hence, in terms of the regression 
model: the criterion is intention, the predictors are
attitude and subjective norm, and the standardized 
regression coefficients are the estimates of the weights.
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) strongly emphasize their 
position that intention formation can not be affected by 
variables external to the reasoned action model; that is, 
intentions are formed only via the influence of the 
attitude component, the subjective norm component, or the 
weights of either of these two components. Further, an 
external variable (e.g., self-esteem) may affect one of the 
components of the model without affecting intention if the 
weight for that component renders its relative contribution 
to intention insignificant. For example, if the regression 
coefficient for the attitude component is very large and 
the coefficient for the subjective norm component is very 
small, changes in the subjective norm component 
attributable to an external variable will tend to
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contribute very little to the overall prediction o-f 
intention. In short, intention is affected only indirectly 
by any variable other than attitude and subjective norm (or 
their relative weights) as they are defined by the theory 
of reasoned action.
Much of Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) discussion 
regarding this principle revolves around the issue of the 
extent to which attitudes towards objects predict 
intentions. By reference to a number of prior studies, 
Fishbein and Ajzen demonstrate the lack of a necessary 
relationship between attitudes towards objects and 
intentions. For example, an individual may have a strong, 
positive attitude toward sports cars but may not intend to 
purchase one. Where a significant relationship is found 
between attitudes towards objects and intentions, Fishbein 
and Ajzen show the integral role the elements of the 
reasoned action model play in this outcome. Further, over 
half of Ajzen and Fishbein's (1980) book is devoted to 
reinterpreting the nature of attitude—behavior
relationships in a wide variety of behavioral domains. In 
their words: "where an external variable is consistently 
found to be related to the behavior under investigation, 
we...show that its effects are mediated by the predictors 
in our theory" (p. 97).
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As was the case with respect to behavioral beliefs, 
normative beliefs, attitudes, and subjective norms, 
accurate prediction of intention, hence behavior, assumes 
that the attitudinal and subjective norm components 
correspond to the intention being predicted along the 
dimensions of target, action, context and time. Direct 
measures of intention are obtained in terms of subjective 
probability estimates about the extent to which some 
behavior is intended to be performed. According to the 
theory of reasoned action, such measures of intention 
should be predicted with considerable accuracy on the basis 
of direct measures of the attitude and subjective norm 
components.
Note that prediction of intention is not dependent on 
assessment of underlying beliefs, whereas detailed 
explanation of intention is dependent on such assessment. 
For example, attitude and subjective norm scores could be
derived on the basis of extremely different patterns of
/
underlying beliefs. To illustrate, a strong belief in the 
negative consequences of radiation could account for most 
of the variance in one individuals negative attitude toward 
nuclear power plants while a strong belief in the negative 
consequences of institutionalized control over electrical 
resources could account for the majority of variance in the
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negative attitude of another individual.
As previously mentioned, intentions are held to be the 
immediate determinants of volitional behavior. Hence, 
given accurate assessment of intentions, with complete 
correspondence between measures of intention and behavioral 
criteria, the major factor thought to affect whether or not 
the behavior occurs is the stability of the intention over 
time. Although Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) allow for the 
possibility that intention may decay simply as a function 
of time, strictly speaking, the instability of intentions 
is the result of new information entering the system. This 
point is central to the present study! As new information 
enters the system, the salient set of beliefs may change 
which could change attitudes and/or subjective norms, which 
would alter the equation that predicted the original 
intention. Given the normal course of daily events, the 
longer the time between intention assessment and the 
behavioral criterion, the more information that could 
potentially alter the equation. Hence, predicting behavior 
from intention generally becomes less accurate as a 
function of the time between the two assessments.
Based on this reasoning, controlling the flow of 
information —  as in a controlled lab study —  should have 
predictable effects on intention. For example, providing
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one group with new information that is relevant to a 
particular intention and providing a second group with no 
new information that is relevant to a particular intention 
should result in greater shifts in the extremity of 
intentions for the former group. Further, it should be 
possible to determine which types of information are most 
likely to alter intentions by selectively exposing 
different subjects to different types of information. For 
example, it could be that processing information that is 
relevant to the beliefs underlying a given attitude has'the 
effect of altering this attitude (or the weight given to 
this attitude). Likewise, it could be that exposing a 
subject to information that indicates that a salient 
referent opposes one’s attitudes might alter this subject’s 
subjective norms (or the weight given to the subjective 
norm). If the reasoned action model is valid, then the 
effects of virtually any type of situational information 
should be evident at several places in the model.
One possible strategy for dealing with the lack of 
predictabi1ity due to the instability of intentions is to 
assess what Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) refer to as 
conditional intentions. Conditional intentions can be used 
to assess the effects of extraneous events which are likely 
to affect the stability of the relevant intention and which
31
are likely to occur prior to the predicted behavior. 
Theoretically, asking subjects to indicate the subjective 
probability of engaging in behavior x given the occurrence 
of event y should result in improved prediction.
To study the nature of intention stability itself, 
however, requires tight control over the information
available to subjects for processing. This means that 
every aspect of the reasoned action model must be assessed 
within the context of a single experimental scenario. The 
importance of this principle for the present study will be 
taken up in greater detail in a later section.
To summarize, Fishbein and Ajzen’s <1975; Ajzen St 
Fishbein, 1980) theory of reasoned action provides a model 
for the prediction and explanation of behavior. The
components of the model are amenable to empirical 
assessment. In addition, each element of the model is both 
conceptually and empirically distinct while standing in 
definite relationship to the other elements. Such a well 
organized system allows for maximum versatility in
approaching a wide variety of psychological and behavioral 
phenomena. The present study will illustrate this
versatility by using the reasoned action model as a 
framework for further articulating the very complex and 
often subtle interactions among person variables, situation
variables, and behavior.
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Chapter 3s Personality and Attitude-Behavior
Consistency
While study of the relationships between attitudes and 
behavior and between personality traits and behavior have 
both flourished, the relationship between personality and 
attitudes has received very little attention by 
psychologists. In one of the few attempts to address the 
nature of the relationship between traits and attitudes,
Sherman and Fazio (1983) provided an overview of the
historic, methodological, and conceptual parallels between 
these two predictors of behavior. Perhaps due to the lack 
of integration between these two areas, it is rare to find 
trait-behavior research that includes measures of attitude 
and rare to find attitude—behavior research that includes 
measures of traits. Where studies of attitude—behavior
relations that include personality variables are found, 
very few have reported any meaningful effects attributable 
to those variables (McArthur, Kiesler, & Cook, 1969, 
self-image as a "doer"; Rholes & Bailey, 1983, level of 
moral reasoning; Snyder 8c Swann, 1976, self—monitoring). 
Further, of the personality variables shown to moderate the 
attitude-behavior relationship: (a) none can be considered
traditional trait dimensions of personality and (b) only 
self—monitoring has received much attention. The overall
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picture, then, reveals two very complex areas of 
psychological inquiry, neither of which has been very well 
integrated with the other.
As an illustration of the potential for integrating 
attitude and personality perspectives, there exists a 
growing body of research which is helping to clarify the 
role that self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) plays in 
moderating the attitude-behavior relationship (Ajzen, 
Timka, & White, 1982; Baize Sc Tetlock, 1985; Snyder it 
Swann, 1976; Zanna, Olsen, Sc Fazio, 1980). This chapter 
explores the nature of the self-monitoring construct and 
the relationship of this construct to the attitude—behavior 
consistency issue. Beginning with a brief look at Snyder's 
original attraction to the notion of self-monitoring, the 
following pages will describe the conceptual and empirical 
development of this increasingly papular personality 
variable. Following this introduction, research will be 
reviewed that has found self-monitoring to moderate the 
attitude—behavior relationship. Finally, research will be 
reviewed indicating that taking into account various 
aspects of the self-monitoring scale's factor structure 
results in a more informative and useful interpretation of 
the. role this construct plays in moderating the 
attitude-behavior link.
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The self-monitoring construct. Snyder’s initial 
interest in the concept o-f self—monitoring was a function 
of his curiosity about, first, the nature of reality and 
illusion, and second, "the gaps and contradictions between 
the selves we allow other people to see and the more 
private self only we personally are allowed to know" 
(Snyder, 1987, p. 1). Attempts to gain insight into the 
illusions and realities of self9 to comprehend the 
relationship between public appearance and private reality, 
led Snyder into the relatively uncharted regions- of 
interaction between personality and social psychology. 
Based on a variety of casual observations, including a 
variety of literary expositions as well as on general 
social interactions among his contemporaries, Snyder became 
increasingly intrigued by people’s ability to project a 
variety of public selves to the social world. Upon close 
scrutiny of the processes underlying this ability, Snyder 
(1974) began to conceptualize this phenomenon in terms of 
self-presentational styles, or modes of expressive 
behavior. Four basic features of self-monitoring were 
identified: (a) concern for appropriate self—presentation,
(b> sensitivity to social cues of appropriateness, (c) 
ability to translate these cues into implications for 
appropriate behavioral expression, and (d) the ability to
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actualize these implications behavioral 1 y. The concept o-f 
monitoring, then, refers to people’s tendency to observe 
and control their self—presentation and expressive behavior 
in terms of the four features described above. High 
self-monitors "control the images of self they project in 
social interaction to a great extent. Low sel f-monitors, 
in contrast, value congruence between who they are and what 
they do" (Snyder, 1987, p. 5).
The concept of appropriate self—presentation is 
central to differentiating between high and low 
self-monitoring individuals. According to Snyder (1974),
people who do not concern themselves with whether or not 
their behavioral expressions are deemed appropriate by
those in their social milieu —  that is, low self-monitors 
—  will not attempt to alter their self-presentation as a 
function of situational cues. Rather, low self—monitors 
will confidently express themselves in the way that most 
accurately reflects their innermost beliefs, attitudes, and 
values. According to Snyder (1987), it is as if low
self—monitoring individuals base their social behavior on 
the question, "Mho am 1 and how can 1 he me in this 
situation?". On the other hand, individuals who do concern 
themselves with whether or not their behavioral expressions 
are deemed appropriate by those in their social milieu —
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that is, high self—monitors —  will attempt to alter their 
self-presentation on the basis of situational cues. High 
self—monitors, then, will respond to situational cues by 
projecting the self-image that they believe mast 
appropriately fits the situation. According to Snyder 
<1987), it is as if high self—monitoring individuals base 
their social behavior on the question, "Hbo does this 
situation want me to be and how can 1 be that person?"
Predicting the types of selves most likely to be 
projected by a high self—monitor requires knowledge of 
their standards of appropriateness. Although Snyder (1974, 
1987) does not deal with the concept of appropriateness in 
any depth, he does offer a variety of suggestions with 
regard to the general goals likely to be strived for by the 
high self—monitor; for example, (a) accurate communication 
of one's "true emotional state by means of an intensified 
expressive presentation" <p. 527), (b) accurate
communication of an arbitrary emotional state which is not 
congruent with the actor's actual emotional state, and <c) 
concealment of a variety of emotional states for a variety 
of reasons. By using the skills of selective 
self-presentation and behavioral expression, then, the high 
self—monitor is able to achieve a variety of subjectively 
appropriate social states of being; that is, they are able
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to assess the social milieu, decide upon which public 
appearance is most appropriate, and then project the 
desired image. Low self—monitors, on the other hand, do 
not attend to situational cues of appropriateness nor do 
they have the skills and/or motivation to present 
themselves in a manner appropriate to the situation.
To succinctly summarize the ideas discussed above, and 
to provide an idea of the type of thinking and implications 
that follow from these basic ideas, deferment to the words 
of Snyder (1987) is in order:
According to self—monitoring theory, a 
person in a social setting actively attempts to 
construct a pattern of behavior appropriate to 
that context, drawing on two primary sources of 
information: information about situational and
interpersonal specifications of behavioral 
appropriateness, and information about inner 
feelings, attitudes, dispositions, and other 
personal attributes. People differ in the extent 
to which they rely on either source of 
information. Those who guide their behavior on 
the basis of situational considerations (that is, 
high self—monitors) ought to be very responsive 
to social and interpersonal cues to behavioral 
appropriateness. They ought to show considerable 
situation—to—situation specificity in their 
social behavior but correspondence between their 
behavior and underlying personal attributes may 
be minimal. By contrast, the behavior of people 
who act according to information from relevant 
inner sources (that is, low self—monitors) ought 
to possess substantial consistency across 
situations and over time and the correspondence 
between behavior and underlying personal 
attributes ought to be substantial (pp. 33-34).
The self-nonitoring scale. To come up with a
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measurement device that tapped into the dimensions of 
self—presentation and behavioral expression described 
above, Snyder (1974) began with 41 true-false 
self-descriptive statements. These statements were 
designed to differentiate people on the basis of the 
presence or absence of the four essential features of the 
high—self monitoring individual discussed above; that is, 
motivation to attend to and sensitivity to accurately 
perceive cues to appropriate self—presentation, as well as 
ability to formulate and carry out actions that are 
appropriate to the given situation. Further, the questions 
were designed to assess the extent to which individuals 
actually employ these modus operandi in the course of their 
social interactions. Due to the nature of the content 
domains of interest, some items necessarily reflect 
information about several domains simultaneously; for 
example, the item, "I may deceive people by being friendly 
when I really dislike them," primarily yields information 
about the ability to control expressive behavior, but 
necessarily implies attentiveness to cues of 
appropri ateness.
Each of the 41 items was scored in the direction of 
high self—monitoring, balanced with respect to whether 
agreement indicated high or low self-monitoring, and then
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administered to 192 subjects. After subjecting the data to 
item analysis, 25 items were selected on the basis of their 
ability to maximize the internal validity of the scale. 
The results were cross-validated on an independent sample 
(Snyder, 1974).
The validity of the self—sonitoring construct. At 
first glance, the self—monitoring concept would seem to be 
very similar to a variety of other personality concepts; 
for example, need for approval, Machiavellianism, and 
extraversion. Snyder (1974; 1987) addresses each of these 
concepts and demonstrates dissimilarity on both conceptual 
and empirical grounds. For example, high need for approval 
is not always accompanied by the ability to act in ways to 
obtain such approval. Conceptual differences aside, the 
bottom line is that none of the personality variables 
assessed by Snyder or other researchers over the years has 
been found to be significantly related to self—monitoring 
from a statistical point of view. A notable exception is 
Lippa’s (1978) finding of "slight statistical associations 
between extraversion and self-monitoring" (Snyder, 1987, 
p. 27). Snyder argued that these findings were probably 
the result of overlapping tendencies of extraverts and high 
self—monitors. He distinguished between these two 
personality types by noting that extraverts would tend to
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act consistently extraverted across situations, whereas 
high self—monitors would tend to adjust their behavior to 
play different roles in different social situations.
Finally, it should be noted that a rather rambunctious 
debate has surfaced with regard to the validity of the 
self—monitoring construct. The critics (Briggs & Cheek, 
1986, 1988) claim, among other things, that the apparent
usefulness of the self—monitoring scale in the many 
published reports is most reasonably attributable to the 
individual associations between one of the three reliably 
obtained sub—scales and whatever behavioral criterion is 
being used. In other words, each sub—scale has an 
independent relationship to the behavioral criteria in 
question and different effects attributed to the 
self—monitoring construct are better interpreted as the 
effects due to one of these sub—scales.
In defense of the self—monitoring construct, Snyder 
and Gangestad (1986) provide a detailed argument for the 
validity of conceptualizing self-monitoring as a unitary 
construct. The thrust of their argument centers on the 
issue of how to interpret the factor structure of the 
scale. According to their analyses, there exists a general 
factor, on which 24 of the 25 items composing the original 
self—monitoring scale load positively. It is this general.
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unrotated factor, as opposed to the three rotated factors 
discussed by their critics, that is held by Snyder and 
Gangestad to be responsible for the unique 
self—presentational expressions of high and low 
self-monitoring individuals. According to self-monitoring 
theory, then, the general factor is indicative of a single, 
underlying, causal entity, or latent variable, which can be 
meaningfully interpreted in terms of self—monitoring 
processes.
Whether or not the self—monitoring construct is 
ultimately accepted as valid or rejected by researchers in 
the behavioral sciences remains to be seen. At this point, 
however, the personality measure derived from it continues 
to be a viable tool for the researcher interested in 
investigating the moderating role of individual differences 
in social behavior. To increase the utility of this tool 
for assessing self—monitoring, Gangestad and Snyder (1985) 
have created a revised edition of the self—monitoring 
scale. The purpose of creating this modified scale was to 
assess more reliably the proposed underlying unitary 
construct, to reduce the amount of variance in the scale 
associated with other factors, and to thereby provide a 
purer measure of the self—monitoring construct. This was 
functionally accomplished by deleting eight items whose
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correlations with the -first unrotated -factor were less than 
+. 15.
Relevant Research
As mentioned above, many studies have demonstrated a 
moderating role o-f sel-f—monitoring on attitude-behavior 
consistency: low sel-f—moni tors are significantly more
likely to act in accord with their attitudes than are high 
self-monitors. Most explanations of this effect have 
centered on the simple notion that low self—monitors —  
being more attentive to inner states and valuing congruence 
between those inner states and their self—presentation and 
behavioral expressions -- according to self-monitoring 
theory, should demonstrate substantial attitude—behavior 
consistency. High self—monitors, on the other hand, being 
less attentive to inner states than to situational cues to 
appropriateness, are expected to act in accord with those 
cues thereby minimizing the role of attitudes. In short, 
the results of studies reporting a moderating effect of 
self—monitoring on the attitude-behavior relationship are 
entirely consistent with Snyder’s theory.
Self-monitoring and the "believing means doing" 
orientation. Examining the moderating effects of 
self—monitoring on attitude—behavior consistency led Snyder 
(1982) to characterize the low self-monitor as one who
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generally adopts a "believing means doing" orientation to 
social interaction. By believing means doing, Snyder means 
that low self-monitors "explicitly define their attitudes 
as relevant and appropriate guides to action" (p. 114);
that is, "this orientation effectively provides individuals 
with an * action structure' (cf. Snyder, 1977) or a 'plan' 
(cf. Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960) or a 'script' (cf. 
Schank it Abel son, 1977) for linking their attitudes and 
their behavior" (Snyder 8< Kendzierski, 1982, p. 181). The 
action structure is essentially a set of "instructional 
rules" that induces individuals to relate situational 
information to their repertoire of attitudes, to abstract 
relevant attitudes, and then to formulate and carry out the 
implications of those attitudes. Low self-monitoring 
individuals, then, are characterized by the active pursuit 
of behaving in ways that are congruent with, and expressive 
of, their attitudes.
High self—monitoring individuals, on the other hand, 
are characterized by their tendency to monitor social 
situations for cues to appropriate behavior and then to 
orchestrate their self presentation so that it conforms to 
these standards. In contrast to low self—monitors, high 
self—monitors tend not to define their personal attitudes 
as relevant guides to behavior; that is, they tend not to
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adopt a believing means doing orientation to behavior. 
Snyder (1982; Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982), however, has 
argued that high self—monitoring individuals can be induced 
to adopt a believing means doing orientation to behavior. 
By inducing subjects to reflect on the implications their 
behavioral decisions have -for furthering their attitudinal 
viewpoints, Snyder has apparently caused high self—monitors 
to define attitudes as relevant guides to behavior. This 
conclusion was drawn on the basis of the increased 
attitude—behavior correlations that have been observed for 
high self—monitors who were exposed to attitude relevant 
information relative to high self—monitors who were not 
exposed to attitude relevant information.
Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) first showed that simply 
making information cognitively available to subjects 
resulted in increased attitude—behavior consistency for low 
self-monitors while not affecting high self—monitors. To 
render attitudes available, Snyder and Kendzierski 
instructed subjects to take a few minutes and reflect on 
their general attitudes toward the specified issue. This 
manipulation occurred before the subjects were exposed to 
any details of the court case they would be judging. The 
obtained results fallow from the proposed differential 
believing means doing orientations; that is, low
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self-monitors, in line with their set of instructional 
rules, are expected to use any available attitudinal 
information for the purpose of selecting an appropriate 
response. High self—monitors, on the other hand, lacking 
such instructional rules, are not expected to make use of 
the available attitudinal when selecting an appropriate 
response.
In a second experimental condition, Snyder and 
Kendzierski (1982) showed that by providing subjects with 
information that was relevant to linking their attitudes to 
behavior —  that is, by providing information that 
specified the implications certain attitudes had for 
behavior —  attitude-behavior correlations were as strong 
for high self—monitoring individuals as they were for low 
self—monitoring individuals. The relevance manipulations 
reported by Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) successfully 
enhanced correspondence between the attitudes and behavior 
of both low and high self—monitors in two different 
experimental conditions. It was argued that to the extent 
that relevance strategies include the defining features of 
importance (inducing subjects to cognize that their 
behavior in a given situation has important implications 
for furthering their attitudinal viewpoints, or that their 
attitudes have important implications for their behavior)
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and connectedness (that because o-f this important link, 
"one’s attitudes ought to be connected meaningfully to 
one’s behavioral decisions" Cp. 1803) these strategies will 
effectively induce individuals to adopt a believing means 
doing orientation, hence act in accord with their 
attitudes. Attitude-behavior consistency, then, was argued 
by Snyder to be a function of the extent to which 
individuals adopt a believing means doing orientation in a 
given situation. In line with Snyder’s (1987) view of 
self-monitoring as a discretely distributed class variable, 
low self-monitors have such an orientation built in to 
their personality, high self—monitors do not.
Self—monitoring end the theory of reasoned action. 
Although Snyder’s (1982) theory about the effects of 
exposing individuals to information that induces them to 
define their attitudes as relevant guides to behavior may 
seem relatively straightforward and consistent with 
self-monitoring theory, Ajzen, Timko, and White (1982) have 
provided an alternative interpretation of the relationship 
between self—monitoring and attitude—behavior consistency 
that is based on the theory of reasoned action. According 
to Ajzen et al., differing perceptions of an attitude’s 
relevance to behavior by high and low self—monitors does 
not explain the observed differences in attitude-behavior
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consistency. In line with the theory of reasoned action 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein St Ajzen, 1975) these 
investigators maintain that differences in behavior are 
better explained by differences in the stability of 
intentions. High self-monitoring individuals, being more 
susceptible to situational influences, are assumed to have 
less stable attitudes, hence intentions. As evidence for 
their position, Ajzen et al.'s data indicated that 
attitude—intention correlations were basically the same for 
both high and low self monitoring individuals —  presumably 
confirming the perception of relevance —  but that 
intention-behavior correlations were higher for low than 
for high self-monitors.
Ajzen et al.’s (1982) conclusions are based on the 
following logic: First, they assumed that attitudes could 
be placed on a continuum from "so general and removed from 
the behavior that not even low self—monitors could regard 
them as relevant" (p. 427) to "so obviously relevant to the 
behavior that it penetrates the awareness of even high 
self—monitors" (p. 427). Based on this assumption, it was 
concluded that only attitudes of intermediate relevance 
should be expected to moderate the effects of 
self-monitoring on attitude-behavior consistency; that is, 
attitudes should differentially affect high versus low
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self—monitors only when those attitudes are of intermediate 
relevance. Ajzen et al. went on to assess attitudes whose 
relevance to behavior was assumed to be obvious to both 
high and low self—monitors. In support of this assumption 
they reported statistically equivalent correlations between 
attitudes and intentions for high and low self-monitors. 
Further, assessment of these two measures was reported to 
have occurred two weeks apart, ruling out the possibility 
that the obtained correlation was due to an extraneous 
relevance manipulation at the time of intention 
assessment. Given, the obvious relevance of subjects’ 
attitudes for behavior, Snyder would presumably have 
predicted equivalence in behavioral consistency for low and 
high self—monitors. However, Ajzen e t a l . ’s data revealed 
that high self—monitors were less likely to act in accord 
with their attitudes than were low self—monitors; in other 
words, high self—monitors can apparently be well aware of 
the relevance their attitudes have for behavior while 
simply choosing to act in ways that are inconsistent with 
those attitudes. Consequently, Ajzen et al. (1982)
concluded that "there was thus no evidence to support 
Snyder’s (in press) £19823 suggestion that self—monitoring 
moderates the perceived relevance of attitudes as guides to 
action” (p. 433).
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The implications of the Ajzen et al. (1982) study -for
Snyder’s theory are not entirely clear. To begin with, the 
Ajzen et al. study does not explicitly address itself to 
the notion o-f the "believing means doing" orientation which 
is central to Snyder’s position. Snyder (1982; Snyder &
Kendzierski, 1982) has argued that providing high
self—monitors with attitude relevant information induces 
them to adopt a "believing means doing" orientation. To 
the extent that attitude relevant information results in 
that orientation, behavior is expected to correspond to 
attitudes. Snyder did not, however, address the issue of 
how long such an orientation would persist in an
individual. Further, it is important to note that the 
relevance manipulations used by Snyder and Kendzierski 
occurred only moments before assessment of the behavioral 
criterion. The relationship between the perceived 
relevance manipulation and the behavioral criterion in the 
Ajzen et al. (1982) study is less clear.
According to Ajzen et al. (1982), people will
perceive the relevance of their attitudes for behavior (a) 
when those attitudes are "obviously relevant" and (b) when 
they are asked to respond to attitude statements that 
reflect attitudes toward behaviors. These investigators 
argued that the .equivalent attitude—intention correlations
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■for high and low self-monitors were indicative of equal 
levels of perceived relevance, while higher
intention—behavior correlations for low self-monitors were 
indicative that perceived relevance was not the essential 
factor in linking attitudes to behavior. Depending on 
which source of perceived relevance is focused on, the 
behavioral criterion can be viewed as (a) occurring 
simultaneously with perceived relevance (in the case where 
the attitude’s relevance is obvious) or <b) occurring one 
week after the perceived relevance manipulation (in the 
case where relevance was manipulated via assessment of 
subjects’ attitudes toward their behaviors). In either 
case, if perceived relevance was, in fact, a given for 
these subjects, then Ajzen et al. ’s results contradict 
Snyder’s theory.
Accepting, for the moment, that the high 
self—monitoring subjects in Ajzen et al.’s study actually 
did perceive the relevance of their attitudes for behavior 
(as was ostensibly borne out by the reported 
attitude—intention correlations), a number of questions 
arises for example, did the high self-monitoring subjects 
perceive the relevance of their attitudes to behavior (a) 
based on the presence of a "believing means doing" 
orientation, or (b> because the attitudes in question were
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already firmly linked to the behavior in question; that is, 
due to their obvious relevance? If these are interpreted 
to have equivalent meanings, the question becomes; How 
would Snyder explain the lack of correspondence between
intention and behavior? If there is a difference between
these two points of view, then how are they to be
empirically differentiated?
Whether or not there is a difference between
perceiving the relevance of an attitude for action and 
adopting a "believing means doing" orientation, a useful 
line of inquiry would begin by asking: What factors govern 
the probability that high self—monitoring individuals will 
perceive the relevance of their attitudes for behavior (or 
be in a "believing means doing" state of mind) at one 
moment and be distracted from this realization at the 
next? In other words, was the lack of correspondence 
between intentions and behavior by high self—monitoring 
subjects in Ajzen et al.’s study due to (a) the absence of 
a "believing means doing" orientation, or (b) the 
instability of intentions. Further, there is the question 
of whether intention stability and perseverence of a 
"believing means doing" state of mind are simply two 
different conceptual frameworks, or points of view, 
describing the same phenomena? If this is the case, it
should be possible to design a study whose data would 
support both points o-f view. In the absence o-f a method to 
conduct such a critical test o-f these two differing 
interpretations of the moderating role of self-monitoring 
on attitude—behavior relations, the present study will 
limit its focus to examining the combined influences of a 
relevance strategy and the presentation of various types of 
normative information that could potentially affect 
intention stability.
In any case, several other observations relating to 
the Ajzen et al. (1982) study deserve mention. First,
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) have argued that attitudes and 
subjective norms combine to form intentions. The amount of 
influence of each of these variables is assessed by 
reference to their respective regression coefficients when 
intentions are the criteria. Although not significant, 
Ajzen et al. reported that the weights of the subjective 
norm components played a greater role in determining 
intentions for high self—monitors than for low 
self—monitors. This is consistent with Snyder’s (1974; 
1987) theory that high self—monitors are more influenced by 
situational cues —  in this case, the beliefs and 
expectations of important others —  than are low 
self—monitors. A second interesting result was that the
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correlations between attitudes and intentions were 
consistently higher, yet not significantly so, -for high 
self-monitors than for low self-monitors. Ajzen et al. 
took this as further evidence that there is no reason to 
believe that low self-monitoring individual's are any more 
in touch with the relevance of their attitudes to behavior 
than are high self—monitoring individual's.
The moderating role of self-monitoring sub—scales in 
the attitude-behavior relationship. Although there may be 
confusion with , respect to precisely what processes are 
involved, it seems safe to conclude that the personality 
variable, self-monitoring, is a reliable moderator of the 
attitude-behavior relationship. On the basis of a number 
of factor analytic studies, however, there is increasing 
sentiment among a variety of researchers that it is unwise 
to treat the self—monitoring construct as if it represented 
a unitary, underlying dimension of behavior (Baize & 
Tetlock, 1985; Briggs, Cheek, & Buss, 1980). Due to the 
alleged multidimensional nature of the self-monitoring 
construct, Baize and Tetlock suggested that when examining 
the moderating effects of this construct on the 
attitude-behavior relationship researchers should take into 
accqunt these multiple dimensions. To illustrate their 
point. Baize and Tetlock reanalyzed Ajzen et al.'s (1982)
data by examining the moderating effects o-f three 
relatively stable sub-scales o-f the self-moni toring scale: 
Acting, Other— directedness, and Extraversion (Briggs et 
al., 1980).
The results of Baize and Tetlock's analysis clearly 
supported their contention that the underlying dimensions 
of the self—monitoring construct would have important 
implications for the attitude-behavior relationship. For 
example, the relationship between attitudes and behavior 
was moderated almost exclusively by the Other— directedness 
sub-scale with those scoring highly being the least likely 
to be consistent. The other two sub-scales revealed the 
opposite tendency; that is, high scores on Acting and 
Extraversion were associated with greater attitude-behavior 
consistency. On the basis if this information. Baize and 
Tetlock concluded that 56% of the self-monitoring scale 
does not contribute to the prediction of behavior from 
attitudes.
Although consideration of the sub-scales did not 
reveal any interesting information with respect to the 
relationship between attitudes and intentions, the Acting 
sub—scale was shown to moderate the relationship between 
subjective norms and intentions. Subjects scoring high on 
Acting showed greater consistency between their perceptions
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o-f the expectations o-f significant others and their 
intentions than those who scoring low.
With regard to the intention—behavior relationship. 
Acting was again found to play a significant role. 
Subjects scoring high on the Acting sub-scale were more 
likely to translate their intentions into behavior than 
were subjects scoring low. Scores on the
Other-directedness sub-scale showed a non-significant trend 
in the opposite direction; that is, subjects scoring high 
in Other-directedness were least likely to act in accord 
with their intentions.
The Baize and Tetlock (1985) study included discussion 
of a number of interesting implications of these results 
for understanding the role self-monitoring plays in 
moderating the relationship between attitudes and 
behavior. First, they emphasized the importance of viewing 
self—monitoring as a multidimensional construct. Because 
individual differences along the dimensions underlying 
self—monitoring result in differential effects on the 
attitude-behavior relationship, Baize and Tetlock cautioned 
investigators using the self—monitoring scale to avoid 
assuming that only unitary influences are operative.
In response to the specific results discussed above, 
Baize and Tetlock made several important observations.
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First, they pointed oat that their results regarding the 
moderating role o-f Other-directedness were consistent with 
previous findings; that is, high scorers tend to be shy, 
publicly self-conscious, and lacking in self-esteem (Briggs 
et al., 1980). Hence, highly Other—directed people are
“likely to bend to social pressures of the moment, thus 
producing a less consistent attitude-behavior relationship" 
(Baize & Tetlock, p.39). On the other hand, high scorers 
on the Acting and Extraversion sub—scales are characterized 
as being independent and self-confident in social 
interactions. In fact. Baize, Fleisher & Santee (1982) 
have shown them to "exhibit creative dissent and 
nonconformity in the face of an apparently unanimous 
majority" (Baize & Tetlock, p. 39) which would account for 
their ability to act in accord with their intentions in the 
face of situational cues to the contrary.
Chapter 4a Problem for Research
Research on the relationship between attitudes and
behaviors seems to grow more complex all the time. After
initial assumptions of correspondence (Allport, 1935) were 
questioned (Wicker, 1969), closer analysis (Ajzen &
Fishbein, 1977) revealed that particular attitudes could 
reliably predict particular behaviors. As suggested by
Zanna and Fazio (1982), we seem to have moved well beyond 
the generation of "Is" questions (e.g.: Is there a
relationship between attitudes and behavior?) and are
rapidly making the transition out of the generation of
"When" questions (e.g.: When are attitudes related to
behavior?) and into a generation of "How" questions (e.g.: 
How do attitudes affect behavior?). The present study,
dealing simultaneously with both "When" and "How"
questions, is considered to be on the cusp of this 
transition.
Despite the fact that we seem to be moving into a 
third generation of research on the relationship between 
attitudes and behavior, conceptualizations of the attitude 
concept and the relation between this concept and behavior 
continue to differ widely among investigators (Chaiken & 
Stangor, 1987). Whether attitudes are best viewed as
unitary or multidimensional in nature and what implications
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these various views have -for predicting and explaining 
behavior remain the subject of considerable debate. Given 
the lack of an integrated framework for studying 
attitude-behavior relations, then, it seems especially 
important for investigators to make explicit their 
particular theoretical orientations so that confusion and 
misinterpretation is kept to a minimum. In line with this 
view, a brief sketch of the theoretical orientation 
underlying the present study is in order.
First, consistent with past research relevant to the 
present study, Attitudes are referred to solely as 
evaluative concepts (Ajzen, Timko, & White, 1982; Fishbein 
St Raven, 1962; Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982). As suggested by 
research that demonstrates that behavior can sometimes be 
better predicted and explained by taking into account 
variables other than just attitudes (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1980; Schlegel St DiTecco, 1982), a model that incorporates 
these suggestions is employed; that is, the reasoned action 
model (Ajzen St Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein S< Ajzen, 1975). 
This model includes measures of beliefs and motivations in 
addition to attitudes. Further, assessment of the 
personality variable, self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974), is 
alsq included. Consequently, this study is more accurately 
conceptualized as addressing the cognition-behavior
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relationship than the attitude-behavior relationship. The 
term cognition, as used within this context, refers to the 
general realm o-f thoughts, ideas, and/or mind.
Accordingly, personality variables are considered cognitive 
to the extent that they are represented in the mind
(Harvey, 1986; Kerlinger, 1973; Rokeach, 1961). Likewise, 
social stimuli are presumably processed by, hence
represented in, the mind prior to subsequent behavioral 
responses (Lazarus, 1984).
Personality and the attitude-behavior issue. 
According to the theory o-f reasoned action (Ajzen 81 
Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), "extraneous
variables" such as personality and situational variables 
can not affect behavior directly. Intentions are the
immediate antecedents of behavior, hence any external
variable can only affect behavior by somehow first
affecting the relevant intentions. Intentions, however, 
are only affected by the influences of attitudes and 
subjective norms which are ultimately determined by 
underlying beliefs and motivations. Consequently, the only 
way for personality and/or situational variables to affect 
behavior is via their influence on the beliefs and 
motivations which ultimately form the basis for behavior. 
Because of the wel1—developed structure of the theory of
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reasoned action, testing Ajzen and Fishbein’s extraneous 
variable hypothesis is relatively easy. One value o-f the 
reasoned action model, then, is that it provides a context
within which to test a variety of predictions about the
role person and situation variables play in the 
manifestation of behavior. Further, to the extent that 
relationships between personality and attitudes and their 
mutual effects on behavior have been neglected (Sherman & 
Fazio, 19S3), the reasoned action model provides an
invaluable framework for integrating these two very 
important domains of inquiry.
Regarding the general state of knowledge about the
role personality variables play in moderating the 
attitude—behavior relationship, with relatively few 
exceptions (e.g., McArthur, Kiesler, & Cook, 1969; Rholes & 
Bailey, 1983; Snyder & Swann, 1976, Wicklund, 1982) 
personality variables have not been found to significantly 
affect the relationship between attitudes and behaviors. 
Nevertheless, there have been a relatively large number of 
reports showing moderating effects of at least one 
personality variable, self—monitoring (Snyder, 1974), on 
attitude-behavior consistency (Ajzen, et al., 1982; Snyder 
& Kendzierski, 1982; Snyder & Swann, 1976; Snyder & Tanke, 
1976; Zanna, Olson, & Fazio, 1980).
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Self-monitoring, perceived relevancef and the 
"believing means doing" orientation. With regard to the 
question o-f how sel-f-monitoring moderates the
attitude-behavior relationship, Snyder (1982) has proposed 
that high and low sel-f-monitoring individuals have 
fundamentally different orientations to social situations. 
Low self-monitors are characterized by a "believing means 
doing" orientation, while high—self monitors are 
characterized by the lack of such an orientation. 
Theoretically, the "believing means doing” orientation of 
low self—monitoring individuals increases the probability 
that they will make use of available information for 
linking attitudes to behavior; that is, (a) it typically 
makes them aware that their attitudes have relevance for 
action in a given situation and (b> it provides them with 
clear guidelines for acting in congruence with these 
attitudes. High self—monitors, on the other hand, lacking 
the believing means doing orientation, tend not to make use 
of available information for linking attitudes to behavior; 
that is, (a) they tend not to perceive the relevance of 
their attitudes for behavior, hence (b) they typically have 
no attitude-generated guidelines for behavior.
To illustrate this principle, Snyder and Kendzierski 
(1982) began by demonstrating that making attitudinal
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in-formation cognitively available to both high and low 
self-monitoring individuals was effective as a method for 
increasing attitude-behavior consistency for low but not 
for high self-monitors. To render attitudes available,
Snyder and Kendzierski instructed subjects to take a few 
minutes and reflect on their general attitudes toward the 
specified issue. This manipulation occurred before the
subjects were exposed to any details of the court case they 
would be judging. The obtained results were predicted on 
the basis of the proposition that a believing means doing 
orientation would result in low self-monitoring individuals 
translating the attitudes that they had become aware of 
into the prescripted actions. High self—monitors, lacking 
this orientation, were presumed not to make use of the 
available attitudinal information when selecting a 
behavioral response.
Next, Snyder and Kendzierski induced high 
self-monitoring individuals to act in accord with their 
attitudes by providing them with information that 
highlighted the relevance these attitudes had for
behavior. In one study, for example, subjects read a short
paragraph that prompted them to consider the implications 
their behavioral decision —  deciding which party should 
win an affirmative action lawsuit — would have for similar
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cases in the future as well as affirmative action programs 
in general. In a second study, subjects simply heard two 
confederates have the following interaction: First
confederate: "I don’t know if I should volunteer or if I 
shouldn't volunteer. What do you Think?" Second 
confederate: "Well, I guess that whether you do or whether 
you don’t is really a question of how worthwhile you think 
experiments are." In general, Snyder and Kendzierski
provided subjects with information which induced them to 
cognize the importance their behavior had for furthering 
their attitudinal viewpoints. With this cognizance
presumably came the connection that because attitudes were 
relevant to behavior, they should be acted upon. In other 
words, by creating believing means doing orientations in 
high self-monitors it was possible for these high
self-monitors to link their attitudes to their behavior. 
This effect was obtained within the context of two
attitudinal domains, using two separate relevance 
strategies and two very different methods of assessing the 
behavioral criterion. Snyder and Kendzierski proposed that 
"relevance strategies will effectively enhance
correspondence between attitude and behavior to the extent 
that they successfully induce individuals to adopt a 
’believing means doing’ orientation to choosing their
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actions" (p. 1S1).
Self-monitoring and the theory of reasoned action. In 
response to this analysis, Ajzen, et al. (1982) argued
that the perception o-f relevance had nothing to do with the 
moderating effects of self—monitoring on the 
attitude-behavior relationship. Further, based on Snyder's 
(1982) discussion of the believing means doing orientation, 
Ajzen, et al. reasoned that even if perceived relevance 
did play a role in moderating the attitude-behavior 
relationship, this role would be limited to certain types 
of attitudes. Specifically, Ajzen, et al. first assumed 
that attitudes could be placed on a continuum from "so 
general and removed from the behavior that not even low 
self—monitors could regard them as relevant" (p. 427) to 
"so obviously relevant to the behavior that Cthey3 
penetrate the awareness of even high self—monitors" (p. 
427). Based on this assumption, it was concluded that only 
attitudes of intermediate relevance should be expected to 
moderate the effects of self—monitoring on
attitude-behavior consistency; that is, attitudes should 
differentially affect high versus low self—monitors only 
when those attitudes are of intermediate relevance.
In support of this argument, Ajzen, et al. (1982)
conducted a study in which the behavioral relevance of both
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low and high sel-f-monitoring subjects' attitudes was 
assumed to be obvious but where attitude-behavior 
consistency was shown to be greater -for the former subjects 
than for the latter. During the first of three contacts 
with 140 subjects, several personality variables (including 
self—monitoring) and general attitudes toward voting in an 
upcoming presidential election and smoking marijuana were 
assessed. Two weeks later, subjects completed the 
following measures associated with the theory of reasoned 
action: intentions, attitudes and subjective norms. The 
election occurred one week after the second contact, and 
subjects’ behaviors were assessed via telephone interviews 
about two weeks after this election. The results indicated 
that attitude-intention correlations were statistically 
equivalent for both low and high self—monitors but that 
intention-behavior correlations were significantly higher 
for the former relative to the latter subjects.
The fact that attitude—intention correlations were 
equivalent was taken as support for the assumption that the 
attitudes in question were obviously relevant to both low 
and high self—monitoring individuals. This result was 
interpreted as supporting the view that low and high 
self-monitors do not differ in the extent to which they 
perceive the relevance of their attitudes as guides to
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behavior. The differential intention-behavior correlations 
were attributed to the instability o-f the high 
self—monitors-’ intentions. This instability interpretation
was viewed as consistent with Snyder’s (1974) original
conception o-f the high self—monitor as more likely to guide 
self-presentation on the basis of situational cues to 
appropriateness while the low self—monitor would be more 
apt to regulate self-expression on the basis of inner 
states. Recall that, according to the theory of reasoned
action (Ajzen St Fishbein, 19S0; Fishbein St Ajzen, 1973),
intentions will change to the extent that an individual is 
exposed to information that affects the attitudes and/or 
subjective norms (or their relative weights) that underlie 
these intentions. According to Ajzen, et al. (1982),
then, high self—monitors’ intentions are unstable because 
these individuals have a tendency to rely on situational 
cues to appropriateness as guides to behavior; because 
these cues tend to vary with the social situation, 
intentions are also expected to vary.
Theoretical incovparability. There is one major 
difference between the Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) study 
and the Ajzen et al. (1982) study that renders a decision
on which interpretation most accurately describes the 
moderating role of self-monitoring on the attitude-behavior
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relationship premature. Basically, each study addressed 
the concept o-f perceived relevance in di-fferent ways; both 
conceptually and empirically. These differing approaches 
can be viewed as the result o-f differences in theoretical 
orientation. Because the two studies were designed from 
such different theoretical perspectives, their ranges and 
focuses of convenience were very different. In other 
words, what was important to one of the theories was 
primarily superfluous to the other. As a result of these 
differing points of view, there was a fundamental 
incomparability between the two designs. For example, the 
Snyder and Kendzierski study was specifically designed to 
assess the believing means doing phenomenon; that is, 
systematic variation in the believing means doing 
orientation was introduced and the consequences assessed. 
The Ajzen et al. study, on the other hand, functionally 
preempted any possibility of assessing the effects of this 
phenomenon by designing the experimental situation such 
that there would be no systematic variation along this 
dimension; that is, Ajzen et al. assumed that all of their 
subjects were under the influence of the believing means 
doing orientation as the result of the obvious behavioral 
relevance of the attitudes in question. This assumption 
was then supported by reference to statistically equivalent
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attitude-intention correlations between high and low 
self—moni tors.
Assuming that the equivalent attitude-intention 
correlations were indicative of equally high levels of 
perceived relevance —  that is, the presence of believing 
means doing orientations —  on the parts of the high 
self—monitors, it is still not clear how the events that 
occurred between the assessment of attitudes and intentions 
differed from the events that occurred between the 
assessment of intentions and behavior in a way that could 
account for the differential levels of intention 
stability. In other words, why would intentions remain 
stable for two weeks and then suddenly become unstable? 
According to the Ajzen et al. (1982) report, perceived
relevance persevered from the time of initial attitude 
assessment for at least the two weeks until intentions were 
assessed (as evidenced by the attitude-intention 
correlations). The implication is that subjects formed 
intentions to act that were congruent with the perceived 
relevance of their attitudes for behavior. This intention, 
then, remained stable for the next two weeks until it was 
directly assessed during the second experimental session 
(as, evidenced by the attitude-intention correlations). 
However, as evidenced by differential responses to the
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behavioral criterion by high and low self— monitors one week 
later, intentions obviously did not remain stable for an
additional week.
Ajzen et al. (1982) argued that this instability was
due to the greater susceptibility to situational pressures 
for high self-monitors than for low self-monitors. This 
interpretation, however, does not explain how the 
situational pressures differed across the duration of the 
study; that is, it does not explain why high self-monitors’ 
intentions remained stable across the first two weeks and 
became unstable at the end of the third week. According to 
the theory of reasoned action, intention is the immediate 
determinant of behavior. If behavior occurs that is not 
congruent with a previously measured intention, then it 
logically follows that this previously measured intention 
must have changed or been replaced by some other 
intention. If these new intentions had been measured 
immediately prior to the behavioral criterion, 
attitude—intention correlations for high self—monitoring 
subjects would presumably have been much lower than for low 
self—monitoring subjects. These low correlations would, 
according to the Ajzen et al. analysis, indicate the 
absence of perceived relevance. Because these intentions 
were never assessed, we have no way of ruling out the
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possibility that high self—monitoring subjects were no 
longer in believing means doing states of mind at the time 
of the behavioral criterion.
Further, if the attitudes in question were not of the 
obviously relevant type —  that is, if.they were of the 
intermediately relevant type —  according to both 
self—monitoring theory and Ajzen et al. s (1982) analysis, 
we would expect that high self—monitors would be 
characterized by an absence of the believing means doing 
orientation and, consequently, a lack of consistency 
between attitudes and behaviors. HenCe, even though Ajzen 
et al. controlled for the effects of perceived relevance 
via randomization, because they did not assess this 
variable at the time of the behavioral criterion, their 
conclusion that perceived relevance does not moderate 
attitude—behavior relations seems premature.
Another manifestation of incomparability between how 
Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) dealt with the concept of a 
believing means doing orientation and how Ajzen et al. 
(1982) dealt with this concept involved the differing 
temporal relations that existed between the relevance 
manipulations and the behavioral criteria. In both studies 
reported by Snyder and Kendzierski, relevance was 
manipulated only moments before their subjects were to
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perform the criterion behavior. Contrarily, Ajzen et al. 
on the one hand assumed that relevance was obvious and on 
the other hand allowed at least one week between the 
manipulation of relevance (via attitude assessment) and the 
behavioral criterion. Recall that in addition to assuming 
that the attitudes assessed in their study were obviously 
relevant to behavior, Ajzen et al. argued that simply 
assessing attitudes towards behavior would result in their 
relevance becoming obvious. This, again, obscures the role 
that a believing means doing orientation might play in 
moderating the attitude—behavior relationship. For 
example, if one were to assume that the given attitudes 
were not obviously relevant to behavior, this would render 
the initially equivalent attitude—intention correlations 
between low and high self-monitoring subjects 
uninterpretable from the reasoned action perspective. In 
fact, it would suggest that the obtained correlations may 
have been the result of the inducement of a believing means 
doing orientation during the second contact with subjects 
when they were being assessed on their attitudes towards 
the behaviors under study. The presence of believing means 
doing orientations during this second contact would account 
for the equivalent attitude-intention correlations but 
would raise the question of how to interpret these
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attitude—intention correlations. Likewise, given the 
inducement of a believing means doing orientation during 
the second contact, Ajzen et al.’s implicit assumption that 
this orientation would persevere for at least one week 
after assessing attitudes towards behavior seems dubious. 
In fact, Snyder (1982; Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982) never 
addressed the issue of how long such an orientation would 
affect the high self—monitoring individual.
To summarize, in order for Ajzen et al. (1982) to
conclude that perceived relevance was not an important 
contributor to the intention—behavior link, they must have 
assumed that the behavioral relevance of the attitudes in 
question was obvious to both low and high self—monitors at 
the time the behavioral criterion was assessed. In fact, 
intentions were not assessed at this time. Had these 
investigators measured intentions immediately prior to 
assessment of the behavioral criterion they ostensibly 
would have found the same high attitude—intention 
correlations for high self—monitors that were obtained the 
week before thus supporting their theory. However, the 
following critical point should be noted: according to the 
reasoned action model, in order for behavior to occur that 
does not reflect the previously measured intention, a new 
intention must have been formed. Hence, also according to
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the reasoned action model, attitude-intention correlations 
assessed using intention measures taken just prior to the 
behavioral criterion should be relatively low -for 
attitude-behavior inconsistent high self-monitors thereby 
arguing, according to Ajzen et al.'s criterion 
(attitude—intention correlations) , against the presence o-f 
perceived relevance.
Proposal for clarifying the role self-monitoring plays 
in moderating the attitude-behavior relationship. In an 
attempt to clarify the apparently conflicting 
interpretations offered by Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) 
and Ajzen et al. (1982) regarding how self-monitoring
moderates the attitude-behavior relationship, the present 
study was designed to test the theoretical propositions 
inherent in these two interpretations by creating an 
experimental context conducive to integrating the two 
theoretical frameworks. In other words, the design 
employed in the present study was structured to examine 
more carefully the role that perceived relevance, or a 
believing means doing orientation, plays in moderating 
cognition-behavior relations as represented by the reasoned 
action model.
Unlike the Ajzen et al. (1982) study, in the present
study perceived relevance was directly manipulated and
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potential sources of extraneous influences on intention 
stability were assessed. Unlike the the Snyder and
Kendzierski (1982) study, following the relevant 
information manipulation subjects were exposed to
information that potentially could distract them from the 
presumed believing means doing orientation. The primary 
research question, then, was: Does the believing means
doing orientation, as induced by the presentation of a 
relevance strategy, persevere in the face of potentially 
distracting information? Or, in other words: Is a
relevance strategy sufficient to prevent the 
destabilization of intentions in the face of competing 
normative information?
In an attempt to answer this question, two types of 
situational information expected to differentially affect 
high and low self-monitors were manipulated: information
relevant to linking attitudes to behavior and information 
regarding social norms. Specifically, in an effort to 
maximize the systematic variance in high self—monitors' 
intention stability the following manipulations were 
introduced. First, half of the subjects were exposed to a 
relevance strategy and half were not. This manipulation 
was designed to increase intention stability for subjects 
who received the relevance strategy relative to subjects
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who did not receive the relevance strategy. Second, 2/3 of 
the subjects in each o-f the aforementioned conditions were 
exposed to some type o-f normative in-formation containing 
cues to situatianally appropriate sel-f-presentation while 
1/3 received no information. This manipulation was 
designed to decrease intention stability for subjects who 
received normative information relative to subjects who did 
•not receive normative information. Of the subjects who 
received normative information, one half received 
information that was positive with respect to the
behavioral criteria while the other half received 
information that was negative with respect to the
behavioral criteria. Hence, this design included two 
manipulated variables: attitude relevant information and
normative information. The relevant information variable 
had two levels (presence versus absence) and the normative 
information variable had three levels (no information
versus pro—nuclear power plant information versus 
anti—nuclear power plant information).
Regarding the attitude—relevant information variable: 
as discussed above, providing high self-monitors with 
information that induces them to cognize the relevance 
their behavior has for furthering their attitudinal 
viewpoints typically results in levels of attitude-behavior
77
correlations which are significantly higher than -for high 
sel-f — monitors who did not receive such in-formation and at a 
level commensurate with low self-monitors who may or may 
not have received such information. In the present study, 
a relevance strategy similar to the ones employed by Snyder 
& Kendzierski (1982) will be used to induce half of the 
high self—monitoring individuals to adopt a believing means 
doing orientation. The remaining high self-monitoring 
subjects will not be exposed to the relevance strategy.
Regarding the normative information variable: 
According to the theory of reasoned action, intentions are 
expected to vary as a function of time. Specifically, 
intentions are expected to change as a function of 
encounters with "unforeseen extraneous events." The range 
of events studied by Ajzen and Fishbein C1980; Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 1975) do not implicate any boundary conditions for 
what can be classified as unexpectedly extraneous 
information, nor do these investigators provide an explicit 
definition of these conditions. However, given the 
evidence from research on self—monitoring theory that high 
self-monitoring individuals are particularly sensitive to 
situational cues to appropriateness, and given that such 
appropriateness can be viewed as normative information 
(Myers, 1983), the type of unforeseen extraneous
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in-formation to be focused on in the present study can be 
generally classified as normative information- Recall that 
the subjective norm element of the reasoned action model is 
composed largely of normative beliefs. To the extent that 
the set of salient normative beliefs of any given 
individual becomes altered we would expect a corresponding 
alteration in the overall subjective norm component. 
Because changes in the subjective norm component have the 
potential to alter the intention component, normative 
information can be viewed as a threat to intention 
stability. In short, information that a subject encounters 
after the initial intention assessment that was not taken 
into account during initial intention formation could 
potentially alter the saliency of a given belief which 
would in turn increase the probability of a change in 
attitude or subjective norm (or their relative weights) 
which would increase the probability of a shift in 
intention.
In general, the greater the time between intention 
assessment and behavior assessment, the less accurate the 
prediction of behavior from intention. In other words, the 
more unforeseen information related to intention formation 
that is encountered, the less accurate the prediction. 
Based on this reasoning, it would seem logical to assume
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that by keeping the amount o-f unforeseen information at a 
minimum for a first group while maximizing this information 
for a second group that stronger intention-behavior 
correlations would result for the farmer group relative to 
the latter. Following this logic, each subject will be 
presented with one of two scenarios that vary in the type 
of information they contain. In the first case, unforeseen 
information will be minimized by eliminating as much 
normative information as possible. In the second case, 
negative information will be maximized to the extent that 
subjects will be exposed to <1> the opinions of potentially 
salient referents (environmentalists) who have negative 
attitudes about the given issue, and (2) the approval and 
support of these attitudes by other potentially salient 
referents (community leaders). The situational cues to 
appropriate behavior intrinsic to this latter condition are 
expected to have effects similar to the unforeseen 
extraneous information that may have influenced the outcome 
in Ajzen et al.'s (1982) study. As such, this information 
is expected to decrease intention stability, hence reduce 
the strength of intention-behavior correlations.
To further articulate the primary question addressed 
by the present study, then: Will the relevance strategy be 
sufficient to increase high self-monitor’s
so
attitude-behavior consistency despite the manipulation o-f 
normative in-f ormation? Or, more generally, which 
theoretical orientation can more accurately predict the 
outcome of exposing high sel-f—moni tors to both attitude 
relevant information as well as information designed to 
increase the salience of normative pressures? Snyder's 
(1982; Snyder & Kendzierski, 1982) theory predicts that 
linking attitudes to behavior via presentation of relevant 
information results in high self—monitoring individuals 
adopting a believing means doing orientation. This 
orientation, in turn, is expected to result in greater 
consistency between attitudes and behavior than would be 
found in those conditions where attitude relevant 
information was absent. Or, conceptualized differently, 
given the inducement of a believing means doing 
orientation, high self—monitors would be expected to act in 
accord with their attitudes with the same consistency as 
low self—monitors. Presumably, this effect would be 
reflected both in similar attitude—intention and
intention—behavior correlations for high and low 
self-monitors. Ajzen et al.'s (1982) theory, on the other
hand, would predict the opposite results for the
intention-behavior relationship; specifically, for high
self—monitoring subjects, normative pressures are expected
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to alter their intentions and subsequently cause them to 
act in accord with those pressures despite any perceived 
relevance o-f their attitudes for behavior.
Predictions. Based on the experimental design sketched 
above, the following hypotheses were tested:
1. To the extent that Snyder and Kendzierski’s (1982) 
perceived relevance interpretation of the moderating role 
self—monitoring on the attitude—behavior relation is 
correct: Regardless of the presence or absence of normative 
information, for those subjects exposed to the relevance 
strategy, thus adopting a believing means doing 
orientation, attitude-intention and intention-behavior 
correlations will be equally strong for both high and low 
self-monitors.
2. To the extent that Ajzen et al.’s (1982) intention 
instability interpretation of the moderating role of 
self—monitoring on the attitude-behavior relation is 
correct: Regardless of whether or not subjects are exposed 
to the relevance strategy, intention—behavior correlations 
should be stronger for low than for high self-monitors in 
normative information conditions compared to conditions 
with no normative information.
Chapter 5: Methods
Design and Overview
The basic design was a 2 (high vs. low 
sel-f-moni tori ng) X 2 (relevant vs. no relevant 
in-formation) X 2 (anti-nuclear vs. no normative 
in-formation). For experimental groups, the manipulated 
variables were relevance strategy and normative 
information^ both were between subjects variables. 
Sel-f—monitoring (high versus low), was a personality 
variable.
Both sel-f-moni tori ng and a general measure of 
attitudes toward nuclear power were assessed during an 
allegedly unrelated experiment which occurred between one 
and five weeks prior to the main experiment. The 
difference in times between the two sessions across 
subjects resulted from waiting for subjects to voluntarily 
sign-up during the quarter. At the time of the main 
experiment, all of the remaining measures and manipulations 
were administered. After a brief introduction to the issue 
to be considered, subjects in all conditions responded to 
all of the elements of the reasoned action model which were 
presented in the following order: intentions, attitudes,
behavioral beliefs, outcome evaluations, general subjective 
norms, normative beliefs, and motivations to comply. Next,
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all subjects were exposed either to a relevance strategy or 
to no relevance strategy. Following this manipulation, all 
subjects were exposed to either anti-nuclear normative 
information or to no normative information. At this point, 
intentions were again assessed for all subjects. 
Immediately following this intention assessment, subjects 
responded to two items that comprised the dependent 
variables. Finally, subjects were assessed on the 
remaining elements of the reasoned action model; that is, 
attitudes, behavioral beliefs, outcome evaluations, general 
subjective norms, normative beliefs, and motivations to 
comply.
Subjects *
Subjects were 58 female and 51 male introductory 
psychology students participating for course credit and 19 
female and 16 male student volunteers enrolled in an 
undergraduate sociology course at the University of 
Montana. Ages ranged from 18 to 46 with a mean of 20. 
Random assignment to experimental conditions was achieved 
by first using a median split procedure to classify 
subjects as either high or low self—monitors. Subjects 
from these two classes were then randomly assigned to each 
of the experimental conditions until there were 18 high
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sel-f-monitors and 18 low self-monitors in each condition. 
The data -from 9 subjects were not included in the analysis 
■for the following reasons: Eight cases were discarded due
to missing data and one case was discarded because the 
subject was observed skipping over the pages containing the 
experimental manipulations.
Measures
General attitudes toward nuclear power and the 
presence of nuclear power reactors were assessed as part of 
a larger attitude and personality survey. The following 
four critical statements were rated on a 10—point scale 
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 10 (strongly agree): 
(1) The US government should fund the development of 
nuclear energy resources, (2) nuclear power plants are a 
substantial health hazard, (3) the costs of nuclear power 
out—weigh the benefits, (4) the use and exploration of 
nuclear energy results in a strong nation. Scores on these 
four items were reversed where necessary and summed to 
yield a single measure of attitude. Actual scores ranged 
from 4 to 38 with a mean of 19.23, a standard deviation of 
7.27, and an internal consistency (as measured by 
Cronbach’s alpha) of .61. Based on a median split, Snyder's 
(1974) Self—Monitoring Scale was used to identify subjects
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as high (scores above 9.5) and low (scares below 9.5) 
sel f — moni tori ng individuals; the internal consistency o-f 
this scale (as measured by Cronbach's alpha) was .63.
On two occasions during the course o-f the main 
experiment, all of the elements germane to Ajzen and 
Fishbein's (1980) reasoned action model were assessed (as 
summarized below) according to their suggested guidelines 
(pp. 261-274). First, subjects' intentions, attitudes and 
subjective norms with regard to voting in favor of 
constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula County 
within the next two years were assessed (items 1, 2, and 33 
respectively in Appendix A). For intentions, respondents 
indicated on 7-point scales (ranging from extremely likely 
to extremely unlikely) the likelihood that they intended to 
vote in favor of the issue. For attitudes, subjects 
indicated on three 7—point bi—polar items the extent to 
which they thought voting in favor of the issue was good 
vs. bad, wise vs. foolish, and harmful vs. beneficial. 
For subjective norms, subjects indicated on 7—point scales 
(ranging from extremely likely to extremely unlikely) the 
likelihood that important others thought they should vote 
in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula 
county within the next two years.
To assess underlying beliefs about the issue, the 14
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most -frequently mentioned model behavioral beliefs that had 
been drawn from a previous experiment were rated by
subjects on 7-point likelihood scales (items 18-32 in
Appendix A). Outcome evaluations for each of the belief 
statements, ranging from extremely good to extremely bad, 
were also obtained by subjects' responses on 7-point scales 
(items 3—17 in Appendix A>. Likewise, modal normative
beliefs about the nuclear power plant issue were previously
obtained and used to create the subjective norm scale. 
Subjects indicated on 7-point likelihood scales the extent 
to which they believed that each modal referent thought 
they should vote in favor of the nuclear power issue (items 
34-45 in Appendix A). Finally, motivations to comply with 
these perceived expectations were assessed by subjects 
responding on 7—point likelihood scales to the statement: 
"Generally speaking, I am (motivated/unmotivated) to do 
what (a given salient referent) think(s) I should do" 
(items 46-57 in Appendix A).
Procedure
All relevant instructions and materials were contained
in each subjects' protocols. The protocols were organized
as follows: Each experimental group was exposed to the
following introduction:
Welcome to the public forum on nuclear
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development. We, the County Commissioners, have 
requested the cooperation o-f the Psychology
Department in gathering in-formation about how
people feel about constructing a nuclear power
plant in Missoula county within the next 2 
years. The state has requested that we seriously 
consider such a proposal. Rather than relying 
solely on random public opinion, we believe that 
a more -formal scientific -fact finding approach is 
called for. For this reason, we will ask you
many specific questions.
As university students, you represent a 
vital source of information for our knowledge
base. The most important way you can aid us in 
providing feedback to the state is to answer the 
questions below as accurately and honestly as you
possibly can. Inaccurate information can
obviously be a large problem and can effectively 
make the time we have spent on this project a 
waste. So, if you are not in the mood to take 
this seriously, please indicate this by marking
the appropriate phrase:   Yes, I will provide
honest feedback; __ No, I will not provide honest
feedback. In either case, you will be given full 
credit. This procedure allows us to draw the 
most meaningful conclusions; it is worth it to us 
to avoid the problem. Thank you for your 
cooperation.
Please keep in mind that all of the 
information obtained in this research will be 
anonymous; your identity will in no way be 
associated with any information you give us.
At this point, all subjects in each experimental
condition completed the reasoned action measures (see
appendix A). Next, all experimental protocols contained the
following review:
Considering whether or not to support the 
construction of a nuclear power plant is a very 
complex activity. Obviously, only a brief review 
of the issue is possible here. The Department of 
Energy is the branch of the U.S. government that 
is responsible for dealing with issues related to 
' basic energy requirements for American society. 
Because our current energy requirements are being 
satisfied primarily by relying on fossil fuels,
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and because these -fuels are a non—renewable
resource, the Department o-f Energy encourages
state governments to pursue alternative energy 
sources. The bottom line is this: Fossil -fuel
resources (e.g., coal, natural gas, oil, etc.)
will eventually be exhausted. It makes no sense 
to wait until all of our current resources have 
been depleted. Therefore, as a nation, we must 
seek out alternative sources of energy (e.g., 
nuclear, solar, hydro, etc.).
Nuclear energy has been part of the lives a 
millions of Americans for many years. Most of us 
do not realise the extent to which the 
electricity we use is provided by nuclear power 
plants. Nevertheless, as with most issues of 
concern in our society, there are many people who 
agree with the use of nuclear power and many 
people who do not agree with the use of nuclear 
power. The impact nuclear power plants have had 
on the local economies, the surrounding 
environments, and the communities in general has 
varied greatly from location to location. And 
although a great deal of information has been 
collected that documents many dimensions of such 
impact, there is virtually no way to predict what 
the impact will be for any given location. 
Consequently, feedback from the community on 
their perceptions of the issue is vital. It is 
our hope that the information we gather from this 
project will allow us to better understand this 
very important issue.
Following the above information, subjects in the
relevant information conditions were provided with the
following statement:
Now that you have had a chance to become 
familiar with the nuclear power plant issue, take 
a few moments to reflect on the implications your 
decision will have for the people of Missoula 
county as well as people all over Montana. In 
deciding whether or not to support the 
construction of such a facility, keep in mind 
that the feedback we (the County Commissioners) 
receive from this study will be included in our 
report to the Missoula community as well as the 
state legislature. Further, because our final 
report will be on record in the state capitol,
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your decision on this issue could affect how 
other communities handle the same issue when and 
if it comes up for them. That is, this report 
could set precedents to be followed by any number 
of other communities.
Subjects in all conditions then read the following:
We feel that constructing a nuclear power 
plant in Missoula has both good points and bad 
points. On the positive side, such a project 
would probably do a lot to stimulate our 
depressed economy. Jobs would become available, 
people and businesses would be attracted to the 
area and this would result in an overall increase 
in cash flow. Further, the cost of running our 
homes would probably go down. On the negative 
side, such a project can be dangerous and could 
ultimately render Missoula county uninhabitable.
Even if an accident could be avoided, the problem 
of what to do with the toxic waste would remain.
For the anti-nuclear normative information conditions,
the final sentence of the last paragraph of the review
read: Consequently, given all of the available information,
we are in agreement with the environmentalists that a
nuclear power plant would be a poor and inappropriate
addition to our community. For the no normative
information conditions, the final sentence of the last
paragraph of this review read: Given the complexity and
importance of this issue, we believe that it is vital to
assess how the community feels about nuclear development.
Directly following these experimental manipulations,
intentions were assessed for all subjects.
The Behavioral Criteria
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Immediately -following intention assessment, two 
dependent variables were assessed: First, each subject was
instructed to communicate their final decision on whether 
or not to support the construction of the plant by marking 
the appropriate box on an official ballot (item 1, appendix 
B). Next, subjects were asked to indicate the amount of
time they would be willing to spend assisting the County 
Commissioners with their project (item 2, appendix B).
After completing the dependent measures, subjects read 
the following instructions prior to responding to the 
remaining measures of the reasoned action model (items 2—57 
in appendix A): "It is not unusual for people to vary with 
respect to their thoughts on various issues. For the 
questions you are about to respond to, please do not
concern yourself with whether or not you are being
consistent with your earlier responses." Finally, subjects 
were fully debriefed and urged to remain silent about the 
nature of the study until all of the data had been
collected.
Chapter 6s Results
To test -for the pattern o-f correlations predicted on 
the basis o-f Snyder and Kendzierski7 s (1982) study, 
attitude—intention, intention-behavior, and attitude- 
behavior Pearson product—moment correlations were obtained 
-for both high and low sel-f-moni tori ng subjects in relevance 
and no—relevance strategy conditions. This analysis was 
performed after (1) collapsing over the normative 
information variable, (2) using the second intention 
measure which was obtained immediately prior to assessment 
of the behavioral criterion, and (3) using the general 
attitude measure which was obtained several weeks prior to 
the main experiment. The correlations are presented in 
Table 1.
Insert Table 1 about here
The first hypothesis predicted equivalent
attitude—intention, intention—behavior, and attitude- 
behavior correlations for high and low self-monitors in 
relevance strategy conditions and significantly higher 
correlations for low self—monitors than high low 
self—monitors in no relevance strategy conditions. Using
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Fisher's procedure (Marascuilo & Serlin, 1988),
correlations -for high self—moni tors were compared to
correlations for low self—monitors to determine whether
they differed significantly. The region of rejection far a
one—tailed test of equality between two correlation
coefficients (p = .05) begins at z - 1.65.
The difference between attitude—intention correlations
for high self-monitoring subjects (r = .55) and low
self-monitoring subjects <r = .43) was not significant,
zir - r ) = .66, p = .254. The difference between
1 2
intention—behavior correlations for high (r = .81) and low
(r = .73) self—monitoring subjects was not significant,
ztr — r ) = .83, p = .203; and the difference between
1 2 ’
attitude—behavior correlations for high (r = .52) and low
(r = .21) self-monitoring. subjects was not significant,
z (r — r ) = 1.52, p = .064.
1 2
Although these results would seem to support the
hypothesis that exposing high self-monitors to relevance
strategies induces them to behave in a manner consistent
with their attitudes, it should be noted that subjects in
conditions that were not exposed to relevance strategies
showed a similar non—significant pattern of correlations
(see Table 1). Specifically, the test statistics were z(r —
1
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r )= .63, p = .235 for attitude-intent ion correlations,
2
1.44, p = .075 for intention-behavior correlations, and 
.96, p = .168 for attitude-behavior correlations.
Insert Table 2 about here
To test for the pattern of correlations predicted on 
the basis of Ajzen et al.s (1982) study, intention-behavior 
correlations were obtained for high and low self—monitoring 
subjects in both negative and no normative information 
conditions after collapsing over the relevance strategy 
variable. It was predicted that intention—behavior 
correlations would be equivalent for high and low 
self-monitors in no normative information conditions while 
being significantly different for high and low 
self-monitors in negative normative information 
conditions. Using the same decision rule and procedure 
identified above it was found that the intention—behavior 
correlations for high (r = .81) and low (r = .70)
self—monitors in the no normative information conditions,
zir — r ) = 1.09, p = .144, did not differ significantly.
1 2
Likewise, the difference between intention—behavior
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correlations for high (r = .72) and low <r = .55)
self—monitors in the negative normative information
conditions, zir — r ) = 1.21, p — .113, was not
1 2
significant.
Finally, examining the differences between the two
cells which should have displayed the highest level of
divergence in attitude-behavior correlations —  the low
self—monitoring, relevance strategy, no normative
information cell (rClSl = .37) versus the high
self-monitoring, no relevance strategy, negative normative
information cell (rC181 = .39) —  revealed again a
nonsignificant difference, zir — r > = .06, p =.476.
1 2
Chapter 7s Discussion
The results provided no support for either of the two 
hypotheses. Regarding the hypothesis that providing 
subjects with attitude-relevant information would increase 
attitude—intention, intention—behavior, and
attitude-behavior correlations, the results indicated that 
the relevance strategy had no appreciable effect on the 
correlations in question. This conclusion was based on the 
following observations. First, although not significantly 
so, all three of the identified correlations in the no 
relevance strategy conditions were higher for the high 
self—monitoring subjects than for the low self—monitoring 
subjects. This result was precisely the opposite of what 
was expected on the basis of past research and 
self—monitoring theory (Snyder, 1987). Whereas high 
self—monitors have typically shown a strong tendency to 
behave in ways that were inconsistent with their attitudes, 
the results of the present study revealed a strong tendency 
for high self—monitors to behave in ways that were 
consistent with their attitudes. Because of this failure 
to replicate the previously reported tendency for low 
self—monitors to display higher attitude-behavior 
correlations than high self—monitors, it was impossible to 
conclude that the obtained equivalent correlations in the
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relevant information conditions for high and low 
self-monitors were the result of the relevance strategy.
Further, the same trend of higher correlations for high
self-monitors than for low self-monitors was evident in the 
relevant information conditions.
Regarding the hypothesis that the presentation of 
normative information would result in decreased 
intention-behavior correlations for high self—monitors 
relative to low self—monitors, the results clearly
demonstrated that the normative information did not have 
the predicted effect. As was the case for the first 
hypothesis, the pattern of obtained correlations
illustrated a pattern that was completely opposite to what 
was predicted based on Ajzen, et al.'s (1982) study. Not 
only did the presence of normative information fail to 
attenuate the intention—behavior correlations of the high 
self-monitors, but again the correlations of high 
self-monitors were higher, although not significantly so, 
than those for low self—monitors.
There are a variety of factors that could potentially 
have contributed to these unexpected results. From a 
purely statistical point of view, the number of subjects in 
each of the reported comparisons was small enough to render 
the obtained correlation coefficients considerably
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unreliable. When dealing with small sample sizes (e.g., 
under 50 observations per comparison) a single defiant 
observation (e.g., one beyond 2.5 standard deviations from 
the mean of the sample) can have a relatively large
distorting effect on the obtained correlation coefficient. 
Removing the six identified outliers and computing 
correlations without them showed that in this case there 
was virtually no effect on the results. Hence, the
potential problem from outliers does not account for the 
unexpected results.
Another factor that may have contributed to the
nonsignificant results, from a design standpoint, was the 
power of the test of significance. At a .05 alpha level, 
assuming an effect size of .3 and when the number of
observations are unequal and around 35 per comparison, is 
approximately .55 which is very low. That means the 
current design had only about a 50% chance to detect true 
differences of this magnitude. In terms of the standard 
normal distribution, the coefficients being tested would 
have to be over two standard deviations apart in order to 
be considered significant (Marascuilo & Serlin, 1988). For 
example, when comparing the .55 base-rate attitude—behavior 
correlation (Z = .618) of the high self-monitors in no 
relevance strategy conditions to the attitude-behavior
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correlation o-f the high self-monitors in the relevance 
strategy conditions, the latter would have to be at least 
.77 (Z = 1.02) to be considered significantly different 
from the former. However, given the pattern of 
correlations obtained in the present analysis, even larger 
sample sizes probably would not have yielded significant 
results.
A factor that may have had a more direct effect on the 
obtained results was the distribution of self-monitoring 
scores. Because the distribution of self—monitoring scores 
was approximately normal and all of the subjects were used 
in the analysis, a large proportion of the subjects were 
not very well differentiated on this variable. It is 
common in research of this type to select for analysis some 
subset of subjects whose scores fall at the extremes of the 
self—monitoring distribution (e.g., the upper and lower 
quartiles) in order to maximize the potential variability 
of their behavior. Unfortunately, due to the paucity of 
available subjects for the present research, the option of 
using only a subset of the given sample was not feasible.
Even though the distribution of self-monitoring scores 
was not the most conducive to the present analysis, it 
seems unlikely that this could fully account for the 
obtained results. It seems more probable that the observed
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patterns o-f correlations associated with the first 
hypothesis were the result of other factors. This 
hypothesis essentially predicted a three versus one pattern 
of correlations among the four cells of the comparison. 
Both high and low self—monitors in the relevance strategy 
conditions and low self—monitors in the no relevance 
strategy - conditions were expected to show elevated 
correlations relative to high self-monitors in no relevance 
strategy conditions. This latter group represented those 
subjects that past research has shown to be reliably 
inconsistent in terms of the relationship between their 
attitudes and behaviors. Yet in the present study, 
although not significantly so, these subjects revealed the 
highest correlations of any group in the design. As 
discussed above, these high base—rate correlations for high 
self-monitors in no relevance strategy conditions severely 
limited any opportunity to find statistically significance 
differences for high self—monitors between the relevance 
and no relevance strategy conditions.
The question to be addressed here is: Why were the
correlations of high self—monitoring subjects who were not 
exposed to the relevance manipulation equivalent to the 
correlations of all the low self—monitors and the high 
self-monitors who were exposed to the relevance
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manipulation? There are two plausible explanations for 
this pattern of correlations that are immediately obvious. 
The first relates to the nature of the content domain under 
investigation. It could be, as suggested by Ajsen et al. 
(1982), that the attitudes being assessed were so obviously 
relevant to the behaviors being assessed that they easily 
penetrated the awareness of the high self—monitoring 
subjects. If this were the case, then we would expect on 
the basis of the Snyder and Kendzierski (1982) study that 
high self—monitors would act in accord with their 
attitudes. Ajzen et al. mirrored this conclusion when 
arguing that if Snyder and Kendzierski”s analysis is 
correct, "the moderating effect of self—monitoring is 
limited to attitudes of intermediate relevance to the 
behavior (p. 427).
The second plausible explanation for the observed 
pattern of correlations associated with the first 
hypothesis is rooted in the content of the experimental 
protocols. Subjects were required to respond to a large 
variety of statements pertaining to the attitudinal issue 
under investigation, and these statements could have 
artificially boosted the perceived relevance of subjects5’ 
attitudes for their behavior. With regard to this 
possibility, it should be noted that the mere exposure to
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in-formation related to an attitudinal issue technically 
does not quality as an attitude relevance strategy
I
according to Snyder and Kendzierski (1982). Situations in 
which subjects are merely exposed to attitude related 
in-formation would be classified as attitude available 
situations and would be expected to have only small effects 
on high self-monitors' attitude-behavior consistency. 
Attitude relevant situations require that subjects be
induced to contemplate the behavioral implications of their 
attitudes and are expected to have large effects on high 
self-monitors' attitude-behavior consistency.
Nevertheless, the current study involved a much higher 
degree of attitudinal availability than that of the Snyder 
and Kendzierski study. This extreme level of availability 
caused by the large amount of attitude—related information 
in the experimental protocols may have been sufficient to
substantially elevate high self—monitoring subjects'
attitude-behavior consistency. Consequently, a definite 
conclusion with regard to the source of the obtained 
pattern of correlations seems premature.
Finally, what may on the surface seem to be a third 
plausible explanation for the failure to find the expected 
pattern of correlations with respect the first hypothesis 
—  that is, a weak relevance manipulation —  is on closer
examination not a sufficient explanation at all- It is 
true that subjects exposed to the relevance manipulation 
were no more likely than subjects who were not exposed to 
the relevance manipulation to have elevated
attitude-behavior correlations. However, the fact that 
high self—monitors in the no relevant information
conditions had such high base-rate correlations indicates 
that the correlations in the relevant information
conditions, as discussed above, would had to have been 
extraordinarily high for the differences to have reached 
conventional levels of statistical significance. Such 
strong correlations are rarely obtained when using a
general measure of attitude as in this case. Hence, the 
relevance manipulation may have been weak, but if so this
weakness alone is not sufficient to account for the
obtained pattern of correlations.
The second hypothesis tested the effects of normative 
information on the relationship between intentions and 
behaviors. According to the Ajzen et al. (1982) study,
increases in the amount of normative information 
experienced by high self—monitoring subjects should have 
been associated with decreases in intention-behavior
consistency. The results revealed no such effect. With 
regard to this unexpected pattern of correlations, there
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are at least three related contributory -factors that can 
help account -for these results. The -first involves 
subjects' positions on the attitudinal issue. The overall 
distribution of scores on subjects' attitude towards the 
behavioral criterion was positively skewed; that is, 
subjects' attitudes tended to be polarized towards the
negative end of the scale. Because the majority of 
subjects had such strong attitudes against the construction 
of a nuclear power plant in Missoula county, this may have 
rendered their attitudinal positions less amenable to 
change. Obviously, this was a poor choice of content
domain within the context of the present study.
Given this relatively extreme polarization, a second 
factor contributing to the obtained results may have been 
the restricted range of possibilities for shifts in 
subjects' attitudes. The normative information
manipulation was designed to induce subjects to vote 
against the proposed nuclear power plant. However, since 
most of the subjects were already against the idea (64“5i), 
there was not a lot of room for their attitudes to shift
along the likert—type dimension in response to the negative
normative information. Clearly, the presentation of 
positive normative information would have been more 
appropriate.
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Finally, it is plausible that the normative 
in-formation manipulation was simply too weak to be 
effective. It constituted only one sentence embedded in a 
rather lengthy set o-f experimental materials. Subjects may 
have been fatigued or uninterested enough not to attend 
closely to much of the relevant text. As indicated 
earlier, at least one subject was observed skipping over 
the two pages of text that contained the experimental 
manipulations. If one subject chose not to attend to much 
of the text, it is probable that others acted similarly. 
Hence, it may be that there was not a sufficient amount of 
salience associated with the normative manipulation to 
render it effective.
The implications of this study for the theoretical 
propositions it was based on must be largely inconclusive. 
The failure to replicate even the simplest effect of 
differing attitude-behavior correlations between high and 
low self-monitoring individuals renders any substantive 
conclusions dubious. Further, the fact that high 
self—monitoring subjects who were not exposed to the 
relevance strategy and were exposed to negative normative 
information demonstrated attitude-behavior consistency that 
was essentially identical to low self-monitoring subjects 
who were exposed to the relevance strategy and were not
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exposed to normative information leaves serious doubts 
about any conclusions based on the present study. These 
two groups should have differed more than any other two 
groups in the present design according to both 
self-monitoring theory and the theory of reasoned action.
Several strategies could be employed in an attempt to 
clarify the potentially moderating roles of relevance 
strategies and normative information on the
attitude-behavior relationship. First, a greater number of 
subjects could be involved. It is clear that the small 
number of subjects involved with the present study may have 
severly limited the ability for any effects of 
self—monitoring on the attitude—behavior relationship to 
manifest themselves. Second, the amount and type of 
information relevant to the attitudinal issue could be 
better controlled; specifically, it either could be varied 
systematically or simply kept to a minimum. Third, the 
experimental manipulations could be made more salient. 
Rather than embedding these manipulations in the middle of 
20 pages of response items, a more impactful procedure 
would involve active intervention on the part of the 
experimenter. For example, subjects could be given a 
series of questionnaires to complete that could be followed 
by a brief talk by the experimenter regarding the
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importance of their upcoming behavioral decision. This 
talk could also include normative information by means of 
the experimenter (perhaps posing as a jobless member of the 
community) conveying personal opinions with regard to the 
attitudinal issue. Subjects could then be given additional 
questionnaires to complete. This procedure would better 
ensure that the experimental manipulations were experienced 
by the subjects in a manner commensurate with the
requirements of the design.
With regards to future research, exploration of- the 
relationship between attitudinal issues and the moderating 
effects of self—monitoring on attitude-behavior consistency 
may prove rewarding. As suggested by Ajzen et al.'s (1982) 
level of perceived relevance argument, it may be that low 
self—monitors behave more consistently with their attitudes 
than high self—monitors only with respect to certain 
attitudinal domains. Exploring alternative means of
inducing and assessing perceived relevance may also result 
in fruitful progress in our attempts to understand the 
relationship between what Snyder (1982) has referred to as 
the believing means doing orientation and what Ajzen et 
al. (1982) has identified as intention stability. More
focused attention on how these two concepts are related to
each other should further clarify the moderating role of
self—monitoring on the attitude—behavior relationship.
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Appendix A
The questions you will be responding to make use o-f 
rating scales with seven places; you are to make a check 
mark in the place that best describes your opinion. For 
example, i-f you were asked to rate "The Weather in Missoula 
is Cold in April" on such a scale, the seven places should 
be interpreted as -follows:
The Weather in Missoula is Cold in April
likely_____:_____ :_____ :___ _ _ :_____ :_____ :_____ unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
I-f you think that it is quite likely that The Weather in 
Missoula is Cold in April, you would make your mark as 
follows:
The Weather in Missoula is Cold in April
1 i kely_____:_____ :______ :_____ :_____ : uni i kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
In making your ratings please remember the following 
points:
(1) Place your marks in the middle of spaces, not on the 
boundaries:
this not this
(2) Be sure you answer all items —  please do not skip any.
(3) Never put more than one check mark on a single scale. 
Please respond to the following:
1. I intend to vote in favor of constructing a nuclear power 
plant in Missoula county within the next two years:
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1 i kely_____:______ :______ :______ :______ :______ :_____ uni i kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
2. My voting in -favor o-f contructing a nuclear power plant
in Missoula county within the next two years is:
good______ :_______ :_______ :______ :_______ :________s______ bad
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
wi se_____:_______ :_______ :______ :______ :_______ :______ fool ish
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
harmful_____:_____ :_____ :______ :______ :______ :_____ beneficial
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
3. Attracting businesses to Missoula is:
good______:_______ :_______ :______ :_______ :_______ :_____ ._bad
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
4. Protest, conflict, and general social upheaval is:
good______ :_______:____ .___:______ :_______ :_______ :______ bad
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
5. More pollution is:
good______ :_______:_______ :_______ :_______ :_______ :______ bad
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
6. Costing the people of Montana a lot of money is:
good______ :_______:_______ :_______ :_______ :__._____ :______ bad
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
7. Being a primary target during a nuclear war is:
good______ :_______:_______ :_______ :_______ :_______ :______ bad
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
B. Providing less expensive sources of energy is:
good______ :_______:_______ :_______ :_______ :_______ :______ bad
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
9. Attracting people to Missoula County is:
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good______ :_______ :________ :_.____:________ :_______ :______ bad
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
10. Nuclear accidents which endanger people’s health are:
good______ :_______ :________ :______ :_______ :_______ :______ bad
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
11. Radiation leakage is:
good______ :_______ :________ :______ :_______ :_______ :______bad
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
12. The toxic waste disposal problem is:
good______ :_______ :________ :______ :_______ :_______ :______bad
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
13. Nuclear accidents which seriously damage the
environment are:
good______:_______ :_________:______ :_______:________:______bad
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
14. A serious nulcear accident is:
good______ :_______ :_____._:______ :_______ :____ .___:_______bad
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
15. The dangerousness of nuclear power is:
good______:_______ :________ :______ :_______:________:______bad
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
16. Strengthening the local economy is:
good______:_______ :_________:______ :_______:________:______bad
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
17. Providing job opportunities for the unemployed is:
good______ :_______ :_______ :______ :_______ :_______ :______ bad
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
18. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years would attract businesses to 
Missoula:
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1 ikely_____:______ :______ :____:______ :____  :____uni i kel y
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
19. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years would result in protest, conflict
and general social upheaval:
1 ikely______s______ :______ :.______:_____ :______ :____ uni ikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
20. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years would result in more pollution:
1 ikely_____:______ :______ :_____ :______ :_____ :____ _unl i kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
21. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years would cost the people of Montana 
a lot of money:
1 i kely_____:______ :_______:_____ :______ :______: uni i kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
22. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years would make Missoula a primary 
target during a nuclear war:
li kely_____:______ :_______:_____ :______ :______: uni i kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
23. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years would provide a less expensive 
source of energy (e.g., electricity
1 i kely_____:______ :______:______:______:______ : uni i kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
24. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years would attract people to Missoula:
li kely_____:______ :______:______:______:______ : uni ikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
25. A nuclear accident in Missoula County within the next 
two years would be a health hazzard:
1 i kely_____ :______ :______ :_____ :______ :_____ :______ uni i kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
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26. I-f a nuclear power plant were constructed in Missoula 
county within the next two years, radiation leakage would 
be a major problem:
1 i kely_____ :____ :______ :______:______:______ :______ uni i kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
27. Toxic waste disposal would be a major problem -for a 
nuclear power plant in Missoula county:
likely :_____:_______  :______ :______ :______ unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
28. A nuclear accident in Missoula county would seriously 
damage the environment:
1 i kely_____ :____ :______ :______:______:______ :______ uni i kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
29. I-f a nuclear power plant were constructed in Missoula 
county within the next two years, the chance o-f a serious 
accident occuring would be great:
1 i kely_____ :____ :______:______:______:____.__:______ unli kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
30. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years would be, dangerous:
1 i kely_____ :____ :______ : : ______:______ :______ uni i kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
31. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years would strengthen the local 
economy:
1 ikely____ _:____ :______ :______:______:______ :______ uni i kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
32. Constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years would provide job opportunities 
-for the unemployed:
likely______:____ :______ :______:______;______ :______ unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
33. Most people who are important to me think I should 
vote in favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in
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Missoula county within the ne:;t two years:
1 ikely_____:_____ :______ :_____ :______ :______ : uni i kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
34. My friends think I should vote in favor of 
constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years:
likely_____: _____:_______  :______ :______ :______ unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
35. The scientific community thinks I should vote in favor 
of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years:
1 i kely_____:_____ :_______ :_____ :______:______ :______ uni i kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
36. Pro—nuclear groups think I should vote in favor of 
constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years:
1 ikely_____:_____ :____ :______:______:______ :______ uni i kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
37. Missoulians think I should vote in favor of 
constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years:
likely_____:_____ s_______ : : ______ :______ :______ unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
38. Most members of my family think I should vote in favor 
of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years:
likely_____:_____ : :    :_:______ unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
39. The people who construct and maintain the proposed 
nuclear power plant think I should vote in favor of 
constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years:
likely_____:_____ :_______ :_____ :______:______ :______ unlikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
40. Granolas think I should vote in favor of constructing
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a nuclear power plant in Missoula county within the next 
two years:
1 i kely____ :_____ :______ :_____ :______:______ : uni ikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
41. Anti-nuclear groups think I should vote in favor of 
constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years:
1 i kely____ :_____ :_1_____:_____ :______:______ : uni i kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
42. The government/politicians think I should vote in 
favor of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula 
county within the next two years:
1 i kely_____:_____ :__ ;____:_____ :______:______ : uni i kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
43. The business community thinks I should vote in favor 
of constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years:
1 i kely_____:_____ :_______  :______ :______ :_____  uni i kely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
44. The unemployed think I should vote in favor of 
constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years:
1 i kely_____:_____ :______ :_____ :______ :_____ :______ uni i kel y
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
45. Environmentalists think I should vote in favor of 
constructing a nuclear power plant in Missoula county 
within the next two years:
1 i kely_____:_____ :______ :_____ :______ :______ :______ uni ikely
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
46. Generally speaking, I am
motivated :_____:_______:____:_____:____:_____ unmot i vateti
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
to do what my friends want me to do.
47. Generally speaking, I am
motivated____________s____________:_____ :_____ :_____ :____ _unmoti vated
extremely quite slightly neither slightly qui te extremely
to do what the scientific community wants me to do.
48. Generally speaking, I am
motivated____________:____________:________________:_____ :_____ :____ _ am ^_unmoti vated
extremely quite slightly neither slightly qui te extremely
to do what pro—nuclear groups want me to do.
49. Generally speaking, I am
motivated____________:_____________:_______________:________________:________________:______________ • _unmoti vated
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
to do what Missoulians want me to do.
50. Generally speaking, I am
motivated : : : s : • unmoti vated
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
to do what my family wants me to do.
51. Generally speaking, I am
motivated : : : : : •m unmotivated
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
to do what the people who construct and maintain the
proposed nuclear power plant want me to do.
52. Generally speaking, I am
motivated : : : : : ■m unmotivated
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
to do what granolas want me to do.
53. Generally speaking, I am
motivated : : : : i 5 unmoti vated
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely 
to do what anti—nuclear groups want me to do.
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54. Generally speaking, I am
mot i vated____ :____:_____s  ____ :______:____ :_____ unmotivated
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
to do what the government/politicians want me to do.
55. Generally speaking, I am
motivated____ :____:_____:______ :_____ :____ :_____ unmotivated
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
to do what the business community wants me to do.
56. Generally speaking, I am
motivated____ :____s_____:______:_____ :____ :_____ unmotivated
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
to do what the unemployed want me to do.
57. Generally speaking, I am
mot i vated____ :____:_____:______:_____ :____ s_____ unmot i vat ed
extremely quite slightly neither slightly quite extremely
to do what environmentalists want me to do.
Appendix B
Official Ballot
Yes, I support the construction of a nuclear power 
plant in Missoula county within the next two years.
No, I do not support the construction of a nuclear 
power plant in Missoula county within the next two 
years.
2. How much time would you be willing to spend assisting 
the County Commissioners with this project?
  not at al1.
  up to 1 hour.
  up to 2 hours.
  up to 4 hours.
  up to 6 hours.
more than 6 hours.
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Table 1
Carrelations , z-Statistics, Probability Levels, and Cell 
Sizes for High and Lon Self-Monitors in Relevance versus 
No Relevance Strategy Conditions
Self—Monitoring
Condition Low High
Relevance Strategy
Attitude—Intention .43 .55 z = .66, P = .25
Intention—Behavior .73 .SI z = .83, P = .20
Attitude—Behavior .21 .52 Z = Nin•H P = .06
n 37 39
No Relevance Strategy
Attitude—Intention .64 .72 z = . 60., P = .24
Intenti on—Behavi or .51 .72 z = 1.44, P = .08
Att i tude—Behavi or .37 .55 z = .96, P = - 17
n 35 41
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Table 2
Correlations, z-Statistics, Probability Levels, and Cell 
Sizes for High and Lott Self-Monitors in Normative versus No 
Normative Information Conditions
Self--Monitoring
Condition Low High
Normative Information
Intention—Behavior .55 .72 z = 1.21, p = . 11
n 36 40
No Normative Information
Intention—Behavior .70 .81 2- = 1.09, p = .14
n 36 40
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